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My late grandmother was born during the First World War in Tomashov 
(Tomaszów)-Lubelski, a town in Poland. When she was in elementary school, 
some of the students disturbed the teacher when she turned to the blackboard. 
The teacher became very angry. She took her cane and collectively punished 
the class. She ordered all the students to stretch out their hands for her to hit 
them with the cane. My grandmother refused; she argued that she had done 
nothing wrong, she had not spoken or caused a disturbance, so she was not 
prepared to put out her hand to be punished. The teacher insisted and my 
grandmother tried to draw back. The teacher grabbed her hand by force, pulled 
it, and struck her very hard. My grandmother fainted; she lost a lot of blood and 
became very sick. For two months she hovered between life and death. She 
survived. Decades later, we, her grandsons, asked her about the indentation on 
her hand. She told us the story, and how well she remembered the blow. Every 
winter she felt a deep pain in her left hand; it was a dark memory of that 
teacher’s corporal punishment. The story frightened us. Years later, it 
encouraged me to research the phenomenon of corporal punishment in general 
and punishment in schools in particular. 
Corporal punishment occurs when a parent or educator hits a child with the 
purpose of educating him. It usually consists of a light blow with the open hand 
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on the buttocks or hand because the child has misbehaved, deviated from the 
right path, failed to comply with the authority’s wishes and instructions, or 
failed to accept that authority.1 
In most countries, light corporal punishment is permitted as a way of 
disciplining and correcting a child. It is less acceptable as a means of discipline 
in schools than in the home. In many countries teachers are not allowed to 
corporally punish their students and, should they do so, it would be considered 
a criminal offense of assault or battery. This prohibition breaches the traditional 
delegation of authority from parents to teachers and whoever else stands in 
their place and fulfills the role of educating and correcting the child, that is, the 
common-law doctrine of in loco parentis.2 
Even though light parental corporal punishment has been banned in one 
way or another in only about two dozen countries around the world,3 and even 
though corporal punishment by teachers has been banned in about ninety 
countries,4 there is a worldwide legal and extralegal controversy over the 
legitimacy of using this method as a means of education. Nothing is 
controversial, though, about the rejection of harsher modes of conduct, such as 
child beating, abuse, or maltreatment. In many ways mild corporal punishment 
is a good test case for the issue of legal intervention in intrafamilial relations, in 
 
 1. Elizabeth T. Gershoff & Susan H. Bitensky, The Case Against Corporal Punishment of 
Children: Converging Evidence from Social Science Research and International Human Rights Law and 
Implications for U.S. Public Policy, 13 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 231, 232 (2007). The authors define 
corporal punishment as 
the use of physical force, no matter how light, with the intention of causing the child to 
experience bodily pain so as to correct or punish the child’s behavior. Such physical force 
typically includes hitting children with either a hand or an object. In the United States, 
corporal punishment is known by a variety of euphemisms, including spank, smack, slap, pop, 
beat, paddle, punch, whup/whip, and hit. 
Id. As to students, see IRWIN HYMAN, READING, WRITING, AND THE HICKORY STICK 10 (1990) 
(defining corporal punishment by teachers as “the infliction of pain or confinement as a penalty for an 
offense committed by a student”). Cf. MURRAY A. STRAUS & DENISE A. DONNELLY, BEATING THE 
DEVIL OUT OF THEM: CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN FAMILIES 4 (1994) (defining corporal 
punishment as “the use of physical force with intention of causing a child to experience pain, but not 
injury, for the . . . correction or control of the child’s behavior,” thus differentiating between mild and 
moderate corporal punishment designed to give the child a painful experience for the purpose of 
correcting his conduct or controlling his behavior and an injury inflicted on the child through use of this 
measure). 
 2. Stevens v. Fassett, 27 Me. 266, 279–80 (Me. 1847); Soc’y for Adolescent Med., Corporal 
Punishment in Schools: A Position Paper of the Society for Adolescent Medicine, 13 J. ADOLESCENT 
HEALTH 240, 242 (1992). See, e.g., State v. Pendergrass, 19 N.C. 365, 365–66 (N.C. 1837) (stating that a 
teacher’s power over a student is analogous to that of a parent); see 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES 441 (noting a father may delegate a part of his parental authority to a tutor or 
schoolmaster who is then in loco parentis); see also Smith v. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ., 295 
S.E.2d 680, 687 (W. Va. 1982) (stating that using mechanical devices such as whips and paddles often 
leads to excessive force and injury and, as such, this kind of corporal punishment is not supported by 
the doctrine of in loco parentis). 
 3. For updated research, see Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of Children Home 
Page, http://www.endcorporalpunishment.org/pages/frame.html (last visited March 30, 2010) (listing 
twenty-five countries that have abolished corporal punishment completely). 
 4. See Gershoff & Bitensky, supra note 1, at 232. 
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the privacy of the family, and in its autonomy and affairs. As to the educational 
system, many states have shown a readiness to ban corporal punishment, 
although they have not taken the same attitude towards parental corporal 
punishment. If one looks at the situation from the perspective of human rights 
and children’s rights, this outcome seems rather strange: if it is the right of the 
child to enjoy dignity and not be harmed bodily or emotionally, this should be a 
general right, irrespective of whether the person inflicting the punishment is a 
parent or a teacher. If the arguments in favor of mild corporal punishment as an 
effective and not-so-harmful way of educating are true, it is also open to 
question why mild corporal punishment should be prohibited in the educational 
system yet given license in the family sphere. But this distinction is made in 
many countries, and there may be good reasons for it. 
There is much academic literature concerning corporal punishment at home 
and at schools but almost none analyzing the similarities and differences 
between the two. This article contributes to the latter, presenting a comparative 
view of how the world’s legal systems treat corporal punishment meted out by 
both parents and teachers, discussing the differences between parental corporal 
punishment and corporal punishment done by a teacher in theory and practice. 
It also deals with arguments both in favor of and against corporal punishment 
from the perspective of human rights and dignity versus the practical 
perspective of the need to educate and correct the child. It also offers another 
angle of comparison—a debate between secular and religious systems of law. 
Section II reviews the prevailing law from a comparative perspective, 
looking first at laws that permit the use of mild corporal punishment meted out 
by parents and teachers and considering Canadian as well as Jewish law, a 
religious extraterritorial system of law. Section II then surveys countries that 
prohibit any kind of corporal punishment, countries whose laws focus on 
granting children a civil right to freedom from corporal punishment, as opposed 
to criminalizing parental conduct, and, finally, countries that permit the use of 
parental corporal punishment but partially prohibit the use of it by teachers. 
Section III examines three common perceptions regarding the question 
whether there should be a distinction between corporal punishment by parents 
and that by teachers.5 The first perception is that corporal punishment should be 
totally prohibited for both parents and teachers. This approach is derived from 
the perspective of both human and children’s rights and from the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), the first 
international convention to focus solely on the physical, social, cultural, 
political, and civil rights of children, a Convention that only the United States 
 
 5. In section III, I review the prevailing law from a comparative perspective. The aim at this stage 
is not necessarily to criticize the different legal systems for choosing one way or another to handle the 
issue, but rather to provide a description of the prevailing situation. For an extensive criticism of some 
systems of law, see SUSAN H. BITENSKY, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT OF CHILDREN: A HUMAN RIGHTS 
VIOLATION 250 (2006); see also Benjamin Shmueli, Who’s Afraid of Banning Corporal Punishment? A 
Comparative View on Current and Desirable Models, 26 PENN. STATE INT’L L. REV. 57 (2007). 
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and Somalia have failed to ratify.6 The second perception focuses on the need 
for discipline and correction of the child; its proponents argue that moderate 
and reasonable corporal punishment should be permitted for both parents and 
teachers, as the child’s educators. The third perception holds that corporal 
punishment should be prohibited for teachers only, and permitted, even if only 
in a particular manner, for parents. 
Section IV sets forth an integrated model suggesting a division between 
parental corporal punishment, which should be banned through civil law in a 
unique and delicate way, and corporal punishment by teachers, which should be 
totally and criminally banned. 
II 
CORPORAL PUNISHMENT METED OUT TO CHILDREN BY THEIR PARENTS AND 
TEACHERS: A COMPARATIVE VIEW 
A. Laws that Permit the Use of Mild Corporal Punishment by Parents and 
Teachers 
Canadian secular law and Jewish religious law both permit the use of 
corporal punishment, as long as it is moderate and reasonable. Section 43 of the 
Canadian Criminal Code of 1985 permits an educator—a teacher and not only a 
parent—to hit a child for educational purposes if he satisfies constraints coming 
under the heading of moderation and reasonableness: 
Correction of Child by Force: Every schoolteacher, parent or person standing in the 
place of a parent is justified in using force by way of correction toward a pupil or child, 
as the case may be, who is under his care, if the force does not exceed what is 
reasonable under the circumstances.7 
The section actually leaves parents and teachers and others in loco parentis 
some discretion.8 Court rulings have hedged the statutory license by attaching 
qualifications. Hitting out in anger is disallowed, since this expresses a loss of 
control,9 and the child is not to be threatened or frightened by the educator.10 
 
 6. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th 
Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Nov. 20, 1989). The convention is known as UNCRC, 
UNCROC, or CRC. 
 7. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C 46, § 43 (1985). This section was included in the 1982 
Criminal Code in Canada and has been reenacted and unchanged from the 1970 Criminal Code. 
Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. c.34, §43 (1970). 
 8. See Joan E. Durrant, The Abolition of Corporal Punishment in Canada: Parent’s Versus 
Children’s Rights, 2 INT’L. J. CHILD. RTS. 129, 130 (1994) (explaining that the rationale of the section 
rests on the idea that parents are best positioned to decide what is in the best interest of their children 
and should be given ample discretion). 
 9. See R. v. D.W., [1995] 176 A.R. 223, 227 (Can.) (“[T]he accused is not entitled to protection 
under section 43 if the punishment meted out to the infant child was motivated by . . . anger.”); see also 
R. v. D.H., [1998] O.J. 3347, 77 (Can.) (oral judgment of the Ontario Court of Justice) (holding that a 
slap made as a reaction to name calling was done out of anger and thus not protected by section 43). 
 10. See R. v. Komick, [1995] O.J. 2939 (O.S.C.J. June 13, 1995) (Can.) (holding that when the 
purpose is to instill fear in the child, the assault is not justified as educational or corrective). 
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Factors to be checked when considering reasonableness in the context of the 
law are the age of the child (a child above the age of fifteen years is not to be 
hit—an age range that has changed over time),11 the extent of the child’s 
readiness to learn from the beating and his acceptance of the punishment,12 the 
extent of the force used and severity of the beating (sensitive body parts, such 
as the head, are not to be hit, nor is there to be kicking or strangling),13 and the 
beating is not to be administered with a tool or instrument but only with an 
open hand.14 
Courts and scholars have criticized the fuzziness of the reasonableness 
element in the statute,15 which has resulted in a lack of uniformity in its 
implementation.16 The Canadian Supreme Court discussed the issue in 2004 in 
an appeal that tried to bring about the repeal of section 43 on the ground that it 
is inconsistent with the Canadian Charter. The court confirmed the judgment of 
the court of appeals with all the factors qualifying the law and took the 
opportunity to rule in addition that a child under the age of two and over the 
age of twelve should not be spanked. The court held that there is no practical 
difference between corporal punishment meted out by parents and that meted 
out by teachers. Section 43 creates an appropriate balance between the interest 
of the child on one hand and the interests of the state and of the parents and 
teachers on the other, which creates room to correct a child or student without 
this being criminalized. The section lays down limits that, if not breached, 
prevent arbitrary enforcement. And its goal is positive—education and not 
punishment. The judges concurred that the statement “reasonable under the 
circumstances” indeed seems overly general, but they held that the section per 
se has content and does not defend any action that is tantamount to causing 
injury to a child. Finally, the court determined that the section does not permit 
harsh and cruel behavior and is therefore not contrary to the Charter. 
Two dissenting justices were of the opinion that the section runs counter to 
the Charter and to the basic rights of children and should therefore be 
 
 11. R. v. Dupperon, [1984] 37 Sask. R. 84, 89 (Can.). See also Ogg-Moss v. The Queen [1984] 2 
S.C.R. 173, 185 (Can.) (holding corporal punishment to be reasonable only when the child is under the 
age of majority). 
 12. See Dupperon, 37 Sask R. at 89 (holding that in determining the reasonableness of the 
punishment, the court must consider “the likely effect of the punishment on [the] particular child”). 
 13. Id. 
 14. See Canadian Found. for Children, Youth and the Law v. Attorney General, [2002] 154 O.A.C. 
144, O.A.C. LEXIS 36, 12 (Can.) (defining reasonable spanking of a child under the age of two as 
involving the use of an open hand on the buttocks, which does not cause physical harm), rev’d, [2004] 1 
S.C.R. 76, 2004 SCC 4 (Can.) (holding that a child under the age of two years is not to be beaten). 
 15. BITENSKY, supra note 5, at 295; Tamar Ezer, Children’s Rights in Israel: An End to Corporal 
Punishment, 5 OR. REV. INT’L L. 139 (2003) (pointing at cases in which parents who used mild force 
had been convicted with cases in which parents who used exaggerated force and painful measures had 
been acquitted). See, e.g., R. v. J.O.W., [1996] O.J. 4601 (O.S.C.J. Oct. 17, 1996) (Can.). 
 16. Canadian Found. for Children, Youth and the Law v. Attorney General, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76, 
2004 SCC 4 (Can.), paras. 153–70 (The six justices in the majority were McLachlin, C.J., and Gontheir, 
Iacobucci, Major, Bastarche & LeBel, JJ.); J.O.W., O.J. 4601; R. v. James, [1998] O.J.1438 (Can.). 
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repealed.17 According to them, the use of any force against children not only 
harms their dignity but turns them into “second class” citizens, creating age 
discrimination that in effect runs counter to the principle of equality, to the 
Charter, and to rules of natural justice.18 These justices believed that the 
objective of these principles and of the Charter is to protect children, a 
vulnerable and weak group in society, and not to contribute to the perception of 
children as the property of adults. The idea that the body and the dignity of 
children are subject to the parents’ wishes, even if the latter are mistaken, is 
unacceptable. In their opinion, the purpose of section 43 is actually to defend 
the rights of parents and teachers and not those of children. According to the 
dissenters, courts have consistently failed to uniformly construe the section’s 
reasonableness component and have been embarrassed by its interpretation, 
since reasonableness is associated with public policy, touched with subjectivity, 
and dependent on so many variables—including, in particular, cultural and 
religious beliefs. In their opinion, the majority’s construing by attaching various 
qualifications in effect rewrites the statute. In their opinion, section 43 is 
unnecessary, since the Criminal Code contains sufficient general defenses such 
as necessity, which applies to cases such as preventing a child from running into 
the street, and de minimis, a defense for light cases. Although Canada has not 
repealed the license granted in section 43 to carry out corporal punishment, it 
has conducted an informational campaign aimed at teaching parents how to 
exercise discipline without corporal punishment.19 
Jewish law, or halakhic law,20 is a religious extraterritorial system of law. 
Even though it does not seem that Jewish law influenced Canadian law or vice 
versa, and although one system is religious and the other is secular, they 
resemble each other on the issue of corporal punishment. In principle, and 
according to the traditional conservative approach, Jewish law permits the use 
of corporal punishment by parents and teachers in a measured way that is 
circumscribed by clear boundaries and qualifications.21 Despite their 
prominence in halakhic discourse, verses from the Old Testament like, “He who 
spares his rod hates his son but he who loves him is diligent to chastise him,”22 or 
 
 17. Canadian Found., S.C.C. at 4 (Arbour & Deschamps, JJ., dissenting). One justice took a middle 
approach, concurring in part and dissenting in part. He held with the majority for parents and with the 
minority for teachers. 
 18. Id. at 181. 
 19. See Canadian Found. for Children, Youth and the Law v. Attorney General, [2002] 154 O.A.C. 
144, O.A.C. LEXIS 36, 19 (Can.). 
 20. There is some debate over whether these two terms are identical. Most scholars think they are. 
But, some think that only some parts of the Halakha are considered law, while other parts are between 
a person and God and are not law in the common meaning. 
 21. See Ronnie Warburg, Corporal Punishment in School: A Study in the Interaction of Halakha 
and American Law with Social Morality, 37 TRADITION 57 (2003). For an extensive discussion about 
corporal punishment in Jewish Law, see Benjamin Shmueli, Corporal Punishment of Children in Jewish 
Law: Traditional Approaches Meet Modern Trends—A Comparative Study, 18 JEWISH L. ANNUAL 137 
(2010). 
 22. Proverbs 13:24. 
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other verses from the Book of Proverbs23 do not reflect the approach of Jewish 
law.24 One should differentiate between verses from the Bible on the one hand, 
verses that in any case should not necessarily be taken literally25 and have more 
than one common commentary, and the law, arising in Jewish law from halakhic 
sources, on the other. In Jewish law, it is generally agreed that corporal 
punishment is not an independent commandment, but rather a means of 
fulfilling the commandments to educate26 and reprove.27 Consequently, corporal 
punishment is not an obligation but merely an act permitted in principle for 
both parents and teachers.28 Thus it is proper and permissible under the law to 
educate a child without making use of corporal punishment. Still, the option to 
use corporal punishment is qualified in view of its ineffectiveness as an 
educational device in certain cases and by considerations of children’s rights 
and of children’s vulnerability (and by the interrelationship of the two). The 
qualifications on this religious license to employ corporal punishment are 
reminiscent of those in Canadian law. Corporal punishment may be 
administered for exclusively educational objectives.29 Corporal punishment is 
 
 23. Cf. Deana Pollard, Banning Child Corporal Punishment, 77 TUL. L. REV. 575, 631–32 (2002–
2003) (raising and refuting scriptually based arguments in support of corporal punishment). 
 24. See generally Shmueli, supra note 21. 
 25. See HYMAN, supra note 1, at 31, for Christian theology of the use of corporal punishment as 
related to the sins of the child and the need to combat Satan by “beating the devil” out of the children. 
Cf. Pollard, supra note 23, at 631–32 (addressing scriptually based arguments supporting corporal 
punishment). Pollard also deals with passages from the New Testament. I do not necessarily agree with 
her conclusions about the differences between the Old Testament and the New Testament, but further 
discussion of this matter extends beyond the scope of this article. I do agree that it is not acceptable to 
support corporal punishment nowadays for religious reasons. Pollard espouses this view especially as to 
modern Christians. I will show that the same is true regarding modern Jewish law. 
 26. Deuteronomy 11:19; see also Kiddushin 29b. 
 27. Leviticus 19:17. 
 28. Cf. Warburg, supra note 21, at 62 (discussing the permissive and discretionary nature of 
corporal punishment in the school). 
 29. RABBI YEHUDAH HA-CHASSID, SEFER CHASSIDIM § 155, 186. (Because an English 
translation is unavailable, this and a number of other sources have not been verified by Law and 
Contemporary Problems editors.  These sources are signaled hereinafter as “unverified.”). A general 
prohibition against beating is subject to exceptions, one of which is when a father or a rabbi strikes a 
child exclusively for the purpose of the child’s education in the course of fulfilling the commandment of 
educating the child. The exemption is not related to a particular result, as it is valid even if “the father 
who beats the child and the rabbi who tyrannizes his student” eventually causes the death of the child 
as a result of this beating. In fact, neither the father nor the rabbi need be exiled to a city of refuge, as 
would any other be for killing someone by mistake. For an explanation of this exemption from criminal 
liability and exile, see Makkot 8a–b; Maimonides, Code, Laws concerning Murder and the Preservation 
of Life 5:5–6; Mishnah Makot 2:2–3. For an explanation of the exemption from tortuous liability, see 
Baba Kamma (Lieberman) 9:11 (unverified). The exemption is granted so that the educator would not 
refrain from hitting children in the process of educating them under the belief that, without the option 
of corporal punishment, the children’s education would suffer. Nevertheless, even in the case of death, 
the exemption is available only when injury occurs following corporal punishment administered for 
purely educational purposes. It is certainly not available when the child dies or is injured as a result of 
cruelty or when the beating was not intended for educational purposes. In these latter cases, the 
original prohibition on hitting remains in force and in some cases a social penalty is also imposed, such 
as banishment or even the removal of the child from the parents’ custody. These punishments do not 
SHMUELI 10/25/2010 12:56:04 PM 
288 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 73:281 
permitted only for children of certain ages—usually six to twelve or thirteen.30 
When the child is younger than six, corporal punishment is both dangerous and 
inefficient—the child will not make the connection between what he did and the 
punishment. Above the age of thirteen it is ineffective, for a teenager thinks 
that no one can educate him, since he is already mature, and there is also a fear 
that he will hit or curse the parent or teacher. 
In addition, corporal punishment should be given only to appropriate 
children, that is, to children between the ages of six to twelve or thirteen who 
the educator can assume will understand the errors of their ways and how to 
improve them. When this test is not met, corporal punishment is prohibited in 
this age range as well.31 
Threatening the child is also prohibited; the punishment must be carried out 
immediately or not at all. Threats on their own merely play with the child’s 
emotions.32 The beating should be only light and symbolic, not intense, and 
should be administered without the use of accessories and implements; it is 
forbidden to strike cruelly.33 Similarly, beating in anger and frustration is 
prohibited, as the blows may be hard and dangerous and the motivation is rage 
and not an educational purpose.34 Also, the beatings should not be frequent.35 
In addition, the license to spank depends on time and season; for example, 
during the hot summer season the educator should be more permissive,36 and 
when a new student comes to the school the teacher is instructed not to hit him 
or any other student in order not to frighten him.37 Finally, the educator should 
appease the child after the spanking and should treat him gently in order that 
he be made to understand that the punishment relates to the specific offense 
and that he is still loved.38 Corporal punishment that deviates from the 
boundaries established by all or any of the qualifications is strictly prohibited. 
Most of the ancient sources in Jewish law refer to teachers. In the past, and 
to some extent even today in the ultraorthodox Jewish world, the child spends 
more of the day with the teacher than with the parent. The teacher was granted 
 
absolve the assailant from begging forgiveness from the child and paying damages. See Warburg, supra 
note 21, at 61. 
 30. See Maimonides Code, Laws Concerning Torah Study 2:2 (establishing that the learning age for 
a child begins at age six or seven); Moed Katan 17a (guiding that hitting an adult son is not 
appropriate); Tur YD 245 (unverified); cf. Kitzur Shulhan Arukh 143:18 (guiding parents not to hit 
“grownup” children and basing this qualification not on age but on the child’s level of maturity). 
 31. See Kitzur Shulhan Arukh 143:18; Responsa Igrot Moshe, YD 3:76 (unverified). 
 32. Semahot (Heiger) 2:4–5 (unverified); Kitzur Shulhan Arukh 165:7; Responsa Igrot Moshe, YD 
4:30 (unverified). 
 33. Igrot Moshe, YD 4:30 (unverified); Maimonides Code, Laws on Torah Study 2:2; Shulhan 
Arukh, YD 245:10 (unverified). 
 34. Warburg, supra note 21, at 61–62; see Hulin 94a. 
 35. Igrot Moshe, YD 3:76, 4:30 (unverified). 
 36. Shulhan Arukh, OH 551:18 (unverified); see Kitzur Shulhan Arukh 122:2. 
 37. RABBI AVRAHAM BEN MADILL SEGAL, MAARACHOT AVRAHAM 196 (1769) (unverified). 
 38. See Sotah 47a. (“[A]s to a child . . . one should push away with the left hand and draw near with 
the right hand.”). 
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the parents’ authority derived from the parents’ obligation to educate the child, 
including the right to inflict corporal punishment, subject to the same 
qualifications on the license to exercise corporal punishment. The sages of 
Jewish law emphasize that the permission to employ force must be reassessed 
from time to time and should not be used when it is contrary to the spirit of the 
time or place or is unsuitable for a particular child in a specific situation; in such 
cases, parents and teachers are instructed to use alternative educational 
methods.39 
Following numerous changes in parent–child relations, a modernist trend 
began to develop in Jewish law in the eighteenth century.40 This trend coexists 
with the conservative–traditional trend that permits corporal punishment within 
the limits of the traditional qualifications. The modernist trend is to prefer 
educational methods other than corporal punishment to correct behavior. That 
trend takes into account changes in parent–child relations, such as the growing 
recognition of children’s rights; the trend seeks to render corporal punishment a 
practical impossibility or calls for it to be used only symbolically. Although 
some early indications of this trend can be found in responsa literature,41 for the 
most part it is to be found in the literature and opinions of moralists and 
educators.42 The result is that corporal punishment still continues to be viewed 
at some level as a legitimate means of education. It seems that present-day 
halakhic arbiters have the authority, as a continuation of the modernist trend, 
to explicitly prohibit corporal punishment if the time and place so require. Such 
a step would not signify an innovation but rather an adaptation of Jewish law to 
the time and circumstances, either by the extension of an ancient prohibition to 
new circumstances or by means of a new emergency act. 
In earlier generations, however, two important arbiters found a distinction 
between parental and teachers’ corporal punishment. Their approach may 
create an opening for a prohibition on corporal punishment by teachers, even if 
not on that by parents. First, Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, the most important Jewish 
arbiter in the United States in the twentieth century, says that the teacher has a 
license to spank children only in studies-related matters and only for serious 
offenses; even then, it is preferable to avoid spanking. The parent, however, has 
 
 39. See, e.g., Rabbi Haim David Halevy, Responsum 28: The Rule of Beating Students, in V ASEH 
LEKHA RAV 195–97 (unverified); Rabbi Shlomo Aviner, Parental Violence in the Family against 
Children, in 163 ITUREI COHANIM 9 (1998) (unverified). 
 40. Responsa Shevut Yaakov, HM 3:140 (unverified); Rabbi Gershon Koblentz, Responsa Kiryat 
Hannah, Question 22, in NATANEL WEIL, SEFER TORAT NATANEL: TESHUVOT GEONEI ASHKENAZ 
1991 (1785) [hereinafter Respona Kiryat Hannah] (unverified). 
 41. See Responsa Igrot Moshe, YD 3:76, 4:30 (unverified); Responas Kiryat Hannah, supra note 40 
(unverified); Rabbi Yehiel Yaakov Weinberg, Responsa Seridei Eish 3:95 in the old edition, 2:49 in the 
new edition (unverified). 
 42. See, e.g., RABBI SAMSON RAPHAEL HIRSCH, II FOUNDATIONS OF EDUCATION—
PEDAGOGICAL CONVERSATIONS 65 (1958) (unverified); RABBI AVRAHAM YITZHAK HA’COHEN 
KOOK, EIN AYAH ON BERAKHOT 31 (1987) (unverified); Rabbi Itzhak Levy, Child Beating 
(Response), 17 TECHUMIN 157, 157–59 (1987) (unverified); RABBI AHARON PAPO, I PELEH YOETZ 
HASHALEM, 175 (1987) (the “Beating” entry) (unverified); 
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a license to spank the child for bad behavior and for trivial offenses as well.43 
Second, Rabbi Haim David Halevy, who was the Chief Rabbi of Tel-Aviv, 
states that a teacher has only the license to hit lightly, and merely as a warning 
to the student. This would only apply to a good student who is being slack in his 
studies and whose conduct, in the eyes of the teacher, would likely be improved 
by the spanking.44 But if the student is behaving wildly and is disturbing the 
class, there is no license to hit him, even lightly, since such a corrective would be 
ineffective, and a heavier beating would in any event be forbidden. In these 
circumstances, other alternatives, such as removing the student from the 
classroom, should be used. The teacher in such a case is no longer in loco 
parentis regarding spanking, since in a similar case the parent would be able to 
spank his unruly child.45 Rabbi Halevy says that in the case of corporal 
punishment administered by parents and teachers, everything depends upon the 
scholastic character of the individual student, the locale, societal conditions, 
etcetera.46 Thus, Rabbi Halevy does not encourage corporal punishment by 
teachers even though he himself does not explicitly forbid it. 
In principle, Jewish law today seems to permit moderate and reasonable 
corporal punishment by parents and teachers, although it is not encouraged and 
is regarded as increasingly undesirable. But in practice, the license to use it 
depends increasingly on the discretion of the arbiters of every generation who 
choose one of a variety of possible solutions that they believe to be legitimate 
and to accord with the norms of Jewish law. 
B. States that Prohibit the Use of Corporal Punishment by Both Parents and 
Teachers 
Many states have banned the use of corporal punishment both in the 
educational system and in the parents’ home; each has used different methods 
in so doing. Cypriot and Israeli law use criminal law, but Cyprus established a 
statutory ban, whereas in Israel—a common-law country, in which the 
precedents of its Supreme Court are binding—changes have been effected 
mostly through the case law. In other European countries the ban was 
implemented through civil family law, emphasizing the child’s right not to be 
subject to corporal punishment rather than imposing a criminal prohibition and 
sanctions on the parents. In the law of the civil-law countries, a general clause 
establishes this right, though without pointing directly at the person who is 
obliged to fulfill it. The outcome is an overall prohibition on the use of corporal 
punishment against children by both parents and teachers in each country’s civil 
human-rights law. 
 
 43. Responsa Igrot Moshe, YD 4:30, 1:140 (unverified). 
 44. Halevy, supra note 39, at 195–96 (unverified). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. See also Warburg, supra note 21, at 64–65 (discussing Halevy’s view and those of other 
scholars). 
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In 1994 Cyprus enacted a criminal statute prohibiting corporal punishment.47 
This was replaced in 2000 by a new criminal law that prohibits any type of 
domestic violence.48 Scholars explain that the law applies to all forms of violence 
towards children, including corporal punishment, although corporal punishment 
is not mentioned explicitly in the law.49 Corporal punishment is also prohibited 
by criminal law in Cypriot schools and educational institutions.50 A teacher (or 
other person responsible for a child at an educational institution) who breaches 
the prohibition would be exposed to a string of charges for battery of various 
degrees of severity, from simple assault to assault causing grievous bodily 
harm.51 Scholars point out that it is rare for light and moderate violence against 
pupils to lead to an actual indictment.52 Cyprus launched a campaign for the 
assimilation of the new norm.53 
In Israel, the supreme court explicitly prohibited corporal punishment in 
rulings handed down in 1998 (as to the educational system) and in 2000 (as to 
the parents), repealing, in stages, a 1953 former judgment, Rassi.54 In Rassi, the 
Israeli Supreme Court permitted the use of corporal punishment in the family 
unit (with certain qualifications), as well as in the educational system, following 
the in loco parentis doctrine. The court held that parents and educators could 
impose physical punishments in order to educate children but had to exercise 
great caution to ensure that punishment was for the sake of education alone and 
not in order to satisfy any desire for revenge—in accordance with the principles 
of proportionality and reasonableness as distinct from acts of cruelty and abuse. 
The supreme court prohibited corporal punishment entirely in the 
educational system by the Sde-Or judgment in 1998.55 That judgment repealed 
the Rassi judgment as to the educational system and totally forbade all forms of 
corporal punishment by teachers, kindergarten teachers, and educators. The 
defendant in Sde-Or, a kindergarten teacher, had been accused of acting 
violently towards children in her class, aged three to five years. This violence 
included frightening the children, hitting them on various parts of the body, 
pulling their ears and hair, pushing them forcibly into a chair or onto the floor, 
grabbing them by the neck and so on. The kindergarten teacher also spoke to 
the children insultingly. The conduct was systematic and occurred over a long 
 
 47. See BITENSKY, supra note 5, at 174–80; Shmueli, supra note 5, at 99–101. 
 48. The Law Which Provides for the Prevention of Violence in the Family and Protection of 
Victims, Annex (I), Laws of Cyprus 2000/I, Law No. 119(1) of 2000, Criminal Code, ch. 154. 
 49. See BITENSKY, supra note 5, at 175. 
 50. Cyprus’ ban on corporal punishment came about by ratification of Articles 19 and 28 of the 
UNCRC and by the implication of section 7(1) of the Cypriot Constitution. BITENSKY, supra note 5, at 
176–77. 
 51. Cypriot Criminal Code, ch. 154, §§ 231, 234, 242, 243. 
 52. BITENSKY, supra note 5, at 178. 
 53. Id. at 179. 
 54. CrimA 7/53 Rassi v. Attorney General [1953] IsrSC 7(2) 790, English translation available at 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/53/070/000/Z01/53000070.z01.htm (last visited July 15, 2009). 
 55. CrimA 5224/97, Israel v. Sde-Or [1998] IsrSC 54(3) 572 (unverified). 
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period of time. The teacher admitted some of these actions but argued that she 
had used moderate force that, although applied out of anger, anxiety, pressure, 
and intolerance, was intended for the education of the children and clarification 
of the disciplinary rules in the kindergarten. The case initially came before the 
Haifa District Court, which acquitted the teacher.56 
The Israeli Supreme Court accepted the state’s appeal and ruled that the 
actions were not educational and satisfied the elements of battery.57 The court 
ruled that the Rassi decision was inconsistent with currently accepted norms 
and that in contemporary times, any use of force by educators, even for 
educational purposes, was forbidden. Corporal punishment would achieve the 
opposite of what was hoped for when the educator, who served as a model for 
emulation, himself adopted violent measures. In this respect, the corporal 
punishment used against the children was severe since it jeopardized the 
welfare of the child and could prejudice the basic values of Israeli society and of 
the UNCRC—human dignity, bodily integrity. 
Between 2000 and 2002 the supreme court reviewed a number of judgments 
by the Civil Service Disciplinary Tribunal relating to teachers who hit students. 
The court again stated the grave prohibition against striking a student for the 
purposes of education. It ruled that such a teacher should be subjected to a 
severe penalty, including a reprimand, a fine, and even dismissal.58 These cases 
regarding the educational system did not permeate public awareness when they 
were decided, but they definitely played a central role in legal developments in 
the family context. 
In 2000 the Israeli Supreme Court prohibited corporal punishment within 
the family.59 The court held in Plonit that corporal punishment administered by 
parents was a completely improper form of education and a remnant of an 
outdated social–educational concept. Justice Beinish, writing for the majority, 
held that the principles laid down in the Sde-Or judgment regarding educators 
also applied to parents, notwithstanding the difference between the two roles.60 
The court qualified its ruling somewhat, though, by holding that the currently 
recognized defenses, including de minimis harm and the state attorney’s 
discretion to refrain from prosecution, reflected the appropriate distinction 
 
 56. Cr.F. (Hi) 117/95, Israel v. Sde-Or [1998] Tak-Meh 97(3) 506 (unverified). The lower court 
noted that the teacher’s actions went beyond what was reasonable but that two central grounds existed 
for permitting the use of force in this case: the limited use of force that did not result in marks on the 
child’s body, and the teacher’s objective of deterring the child, which required that the use of force be 
for an educational purpose. The judge explained that it was not always possible to give effect to the 
ideal that no hitting at all should take place. 
 57. Id. at paras. 9–10; Penal Law, Section 379, 5737-1977, LSI 98 (1977–78) (Isr.). 
 58. Civil Service Appeal 1682/02 Abed El-Wahab v. Israel [2002] Tak-El 2002(2) 1300; Civil 
Service Appeal 3362/02 Israel v. Abu Asbah [2002] IsrSC 56(5) 6;  Civil Service Appeal 4503/00 Amin 
v. Israel [2000] Tak-El 2000(3) 1296; Civil Service Appeal 1730/00 Anon. v. Israel [2000] IsrSC 54(5), 
437–38 (unverified). 
 59. CrimA 4596/98 Plonit v. Israel [2000] IsrSC 54(1) 145, English translation available at http:// 
elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/98/960/045/n02/98045960.n02.htm (last visited July 15, 2009). 
 60. Id. at para. 26.. 
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between parents’ use of force for educational purposes, which is improper and 
forbidden, and “the reasonable use of force which is intended to prevent harm 
to the child or to others, or to allow minor physical contact, even if it is forceful, 
with the child’s body in order to maintain order.”61 This defense is vague and 
unclear; the court presumably meant to refer to cases of forcibly clothing a 
resisting child or dragging him if he refuses to come when called, et cetera. 
Thus, the Rassi ruling was also overturned in relation to the family unit. 
It is interesting that in the Sde-Or judgment these filters, the defenses, were 
not mentioned. It is true that the de minimis rule always exists in the penal law, 
and that the state attorney’s discretion to refrain from prosecution, which is not 
a real defense to be used by courts but only a filter to be used by the 
prosecution, also always exists; but the third, judicially created, defense of 
forceful contact to maintain order was not mentioned in Sde-Or, so it is 
apparently not applicable to teachers, but only to parents.62 
As a common-law jurisdiction, Israel follows the principle of stare decisis; 
the rulings of the supreme court are deemed binding unless reversed by the 
court itself or by Knesset (Israel’s parliament) legislation. The process of 
corporal-punishment reform continued in legislation too, but only as to the 
educational system. Following the ruling in Sde-Or, the legal defense to tortious 
liability of parents and teachers in cases of light corporal punishment was 
repealed in 2000,63 and a declarative section on punishment was added to the 
law.64 But no prohibition on corporal punishment has been enacted in Israeli 
legislation in relation to the family. 
Possibly, Israel took an extremist path by banning corporal punishment 
through the criminal law and in court rulings without first preparing the 
multicultural population in Israel and without launching an awareness campaign 
even after the rulings. Even though polls show some decrease in support for 
corporal punishment,65 the debate in Israel, particularly in connection with 
parental corporal punishment, is far from over. 
C. Corporal Punishment Bans in Scandinavia and Europe 
The most interesting model regarding the ban on corporal punishment in 
both the educational system and the parents’ home may be seen in countries in 
Scandinavia and in Europe, including Austria and Germany. These countries 
have chosen a more moderate way to ban corporal punishment by both parents 
and teachers. In order to create an opening for a value-laden legal attitude that 
would, by educating the public in stages, create empathy for a ban on corporal 
punishment, these countries have adopted a rationale of a structured gap 
 
 61. Id. at para. 30. 
 62. For a discussion of the various possibilities, see BITENSKY, supra note 5, at 206–07. 
 63. Civil Wrongs Ordinance § 24(7), 1947, repealed by Civil Wrongs Ordinance, 2000, S.H. 1742, 
213, amend. no.9. 
 64. Pupils’ Rights Law § 10, 2000, S.H. 1761, 42. 
 65. See Shmueli, supra note 5, at 99 n.119. 
SHMUELI 10/25/2010 12:56:04 PM 
294 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 73:281 
between a clear declaration that corporal punishment is forbidden and 
moderate civil enforcement. This approach conveys a firm message as to the 
importance of protecting children’s rights without irreparably harming the 
family unit in mild cases. The purpose of the declarative statement is a legal 
declaration that is not intended to be enforced in practice. 
A similar approach was adopted by several other states, mainly in Europe, 
where a “prohibition” in civil law was also created and massive educational 
campaigns were launched. The intention was not necessarily to criminalize 
parents and teachers but to pursue real social change. Two of the prominent 
states that took this approach were Austria and Germany. 
1. Sweden 
Sweden was the first country in Scandinavia—and apparently in the world—
to prohibit corporal punishment through legislation.66 In 1958 Sweden 
prohibited corporal punishment in schools, and in 1979 it repealed the penal 
defense against battery by parents who hit their children (causing light injuries) 
for educational purposes.67 In 1979, the 1949 law—a civil statute—was amended 
by parliament by a majority of two hundred and fifty-nine to six.68 The current 
formulation, after a further amendment in 1983, states as follows: “Children are 
to be treated with respect for their person and individuality and may not be 
subjected to corporal punishment or any other humiliating treatment.”69 
The Swedish legislation establishes a right for the child and does not spell 
out upon whom the obligation is imposed. Sweden accompanied the legislation 
with a massive publicity-awareness campaign explaining the new norm and 
providing for alternatives, beginning years before the legislation and continuing 
well after.70 The campaign achieved its objective: most of the population 
 
 66. As early as in 1949, Sweden enacted the New Parental and Guardianship Code, which limited 
parental rights to administer physical punishment and stated that such acts were reprehensible. Even if 
this was not an effective remedy, for that period this was a revolutionary law. For a summary of the 
Swedish ban, see BITENSKY, supra note 5, at 154–60. See also Joan E. Durrant, Evaluating the Success 
of Sweden’s Corporal Punishment Ban, 23 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 435, 435 (1999) (describing the 
history of the corporal-punishment ban in Sweden). 
 67. See BITENSKY, supra note 5, at 155–56; Durrant, supra note 66, at 436. 
 68. BITENSKY, supra note 5, at 155. 
 69. 6 ch. 1 § Children and Parents Code (SFS 1979) (Swed.). 
 70. Following the final amendment to the law, the Swedish Ministry of Justice sent a pamphlet to 
all households explaining that the purpose of the law was to forbid any form of hitting children apart 
from a light smack administered, for example, to keep a child away from a burning stove or an open 
window, posing a danger that he might be injured. See JOAN E. DURRANT, THE SWEDISH BAN ON 
CORPORAL PUNISHMENT: ITS HISTORY AND EFFECTS, FAMILY VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN: A 
CHALLENGE FOR SOCIETY 23–25 (1996). This letter was just one part of an extensive publicity 
campaign for that statute. Leaflets and colored booklets (in Swedish and in ten minority languages) 
were also distributed. Id. at 22. Advertisements were placed on milk cartons and appeared on television 
specifying the reasons for the enactment of the statute and describing how to discipline a child without 
smacking him. Id. at 23–24. These advertisements provided parents specific alternatives and directives 
on how to exercise discipline in a correct way. See id. at 23–24. The Swedish government also 
established an ombudsman for children’s complaints. See Marian Koren, A Children’s Ombudsman in 
Sweden, 3 INT’L. J. CHILD. RTS. 101, 101 (1995). 
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supports the ban, child-abuse rates have declined,71 and child injuries from 
assaults have also decreased.72 The Swedish solution seems successful, since 
from the time of the enactment of the statute hardly any cases have been 
recorded in which parents have been indicted for engaging in light corporal 
punishment. Scholars dispute whether it is possible to enforce the statute 
penally, since it is a civil law and not accompanied by any sanction.73 Even those 
who think that parents and teachers can be indicted for engaging in light 
corporal punishment admit that this is a theoretical possibility only and was not 
the purpose of the legislation: to educate the public and set new norms in the 
hope that these norms would change the current situation without penal 
intervention. In practice, parents and teachers who physically punish children 
mildly are not indicted.74 Still, even though no explicit prohibition was enacted 
on corporal punishment, it is nonetheless clear, to some, that such a prohibition 
exists.75 
Other Scandinavian countries—Finland, Denmark, and Norway—followed 
Sweden’s example. In some the prohibition in the educational system was more 
explicit. 
2.  Finland 
In 1969 the Finnish penal code was amended to remove a defense given to 
parents who used corporal punishment, although no law explicitly prohibiting 
such punishment was drafted.76 In 1983, the Finnish parliament unanimously 
passed The Child Custody and Right of Access Act, which is similar to, but 
more detailed, than its Swedish counterpart.77 Since 1983, there has been a large 
decrease in the use of corporal punishment in Finland—a 1993 study indicated 
that few respondents had experienced violence in the preceding twelve months, 
 
 71. Id. at 22–23; Gershoff & Bitensky, supra note 1, at 250–51. 
 72. Gershoff & Bitensky, supra note 1, at 251. 
 73. Some scholars opine that as civil sections these have only declaratory force so that, in Sweden, 
a parent cannot be indicted for breach of this statute. See BITENSKY, supra note 5 at 156; Dennis Alan 
Olson, The Swedish Ban of Corporal Punishment, 4 BYU L. REV. 447, 453–55 (1984); Murray A. Straus 
& Carry L. Yodanis, Corporal Punishment by Parents: Implication for Primary Prevention of Assaults 
on Spouses and Children, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 35, 65 (1995). But see BITENSKY, supra note 
5, at 155–57 (noting that indictments are possible and that parents can be charged with battery). 
 74. BITENSKY, supra note 5, at 155–57 (“[P]rosecutors almost invariably exercise restraint by 
electing not to prosecute these cases against parents, especially if only light punishment is involved.”); 
Leonard P. Edwards, Corporal Punishment and the Legal System, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 983, 999–
1000 (1995) (suggesting that because each community decides what is excessive punishment, the current 
situation does not allow indictment for mild corporal punishment and that it should not); Victor I. 
Vieth, Corporal Punishment in the United States: A Call for a New Approach to the Prosecution of 
Disciplinarians, 15 J. JUV. L. 22, 47–56 (1994) (suggesting factors for prosecutorial discretion in 
charging disciplinarians). 
 75. BITENSKY, supra note 5, at 154. 
 76. Id. at 160. 
 77. Child Custody and Right of Access Act, 1963, c. 1, § 1. See ROWAN BOYSON, EQUAL 
PROTECTION FOR CHILDREN: AN OVERVIEW OF THE EXPERIENCE OF COUNTRIES THAT ACCORD 
CHILDREN FULL LEGAL PROTECTION FROM PHYSICAL PUNISHMENT 23–24 (Lucy Thorpe ed., 2002). 
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although many had reported such violence in the years from 1983–1987.78 Here, 
too, the purpose of the law is to educate the population to set boundaries for 
children without spanking them and to create greater public awareness of the 
law.79 It is perhaps theoretically possible for an indictment to be brought, but 
there is a gap between declaration and enforcement.80 In Finland, an extensive 
educational campaign was also launched, consisting mainly of advertising 
through the media and family magazines.81 No explicit prohibition has been 
enacted in Finland against corporal punishment in the educational arena, and 
here too, some scholars opine that despite the lack of legislative clarity, such a 
prohibition clearly exists.82 
3. Denmark 
Denmark’s penal code has contained an explicit clause prohibiting parental 
violence against children since 1966. In practice, however, it was accepted that a 
parent may use limited force as corporal punishment for educational reasons, 
although this defense has gradually been whittled away in case law.83 A few 
years after the Swedish ban, similar sections were enacted in Danish civil family 
statutes. The Danish legislature enacted a law requiring that custodians or 
caretakers protect children from physical violence, mental cruelty, or any other 
form of humiliation.84 An amendment was also added to the Parental Custody 
and Care Act in 1985.85 In 1997, there was a further amendment, and the current 
version is “The child has the right to care and security. [He or she] shall be 
treated with respect for [his or her] personality and may not be subjected to 
corporal punishment or any other offensive treatment.”86 Scholars point out that 
this statute does not actually change the norm that was accepted in practice, for 
previously parents were convicted only when the beating injured the child and 
left marks.87 The Danish legislature also enacted a prohibition in the educational 
system.88 Here, too, scholars argue that parents and caretakers can be indicted 
with respect to corporal punishment, but this is only theoretical.89 
 
 78. Id. at 25. 
 79. See BITENSKY, supra note 5, at 164. 
 80. See id. at 162–63. 
 81. See BOYSON, supra note 77, at 24–25. 
 82. See BITENSKY, supra note 5, at 161. 
 83. BOYSON, supra note 77, at 180; Linda Nielsen & Lis Frost, Children and the Convention: The 
Danish Debate, in CHILDREN’S RIGHTS—COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 55, 65–92 (Michael Freeman 
ed., 1996). 
 84. Minors Act, c.1, § 7(2) (1995); Act on Custody and Access, c.1,§ 2 (1995). 
 85. See Minority Act no. 443 §7 (2) (1985) (Den.); Lov nr. 387 af 14. Juni 1995 om 
foraeldremyndighed og samvaer, jf. § 2, stk. 2 (in English: Danish Act on Parental Custody and Visiting 
Rights, No. 387, § 2(2) (1995)). 
 86. See Lov nr. 416 om aendring af lov om foraeldremyndighed og samvaer § 1 (in English: Danish 
Act to amend the Act on Parental Custody and Visiting Rights, No. 416 § 1 (1997). 
 87. See Nielsen & Frost, supra note 83, at 158. 
 88. The Danish legislature outlawed corporal punishment in residential institutions for children, 
permitting the use of force only to prevent the child from harming himself or other children, and this 
force must be adapted to the specific situation and must not exceed what is necessary. See 
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4. Norway 
In 1972 Norway repealed a criminal statute enacted in 1926 that granted 
parents a right to use reasonable corporal punishment for the education of a 
child.90 Fifteen years later, Norway amended its family law to read, “The child 
shall not be exposed to physical violence or to treatment which can threaten his 
physical and mental health.”91 Thus, Norway gives greater scope to parents than 
other Scandinavian countries. Some scholars argue that the preparatory work of 
the law (akin to legislative history in the United States) indicates that two forms 
of parental conduct are still permissible: (1) the use of force, such as holding or 
blocking, to prevent children from hurting themselves or others or destroying 
property (similar to self-defense); and (2) small smacks on the children’s hands 
or clothed buttocks as a spontaneous reaction may be used as some sort of de 
minimis defense.92 Here, too, some argue that parents can be indicted, but 
merely as a theoretical possibility.93 Nongovernmental organizations held an 
educational-awareness campaign.94 An explicit prohibition on corporal 
punishment in the educational system has been enacted.95 
5. Austria 
Austria first prohibited corporal punishment in schools in the 1975 Teaching 
Act.96 There is no similar legislation with respect to other educational 
institutions, but scholars argue that a correct analogy leads to a prohibition in 
all educational institutions.97 As to the family unit, in 1977 Austria removed a 
defense to corporal punishment in the Penal Code.98 In 1989 the Austrian 
parliament voted unanimously for a section of law that “prohibits” corporal 
punishment in the civil code: “The minor child must follow the parent’s orders. 
In their orders and in the implementation thereof, parents must consider the 
age, development and personality of the child; the use of force and infliction of 
physical or psychological harm are not permitted.”99 The section does not 
explicitly mention corporal punishment, but prohibits inflicting physical or 
mental harm, as do the laws in the Scandinavian countries. The statute was 
meant to influence the population to gradually abandon corporal punishment. 
 
Lovebekendetgorelse nr. 764 af 26/08/2003 om social service, capital 21, § 108, stk. 1, 2 (in English: Act 
on Social Welfare ch. 21, § 108(1), 108(2) (2003). 
 89. See BITENSKEY, supra note 5, at 182. 
 90. Id.  at 165. 
 91. Parent & Child Act, art. 30 § 3, as amended by the Amending Act No. 11, 1987 (Nor.). 
 92. See BITENSKY, supra note 5, at 166. 
 93. See id. at 167. 
 94. See id. at 170. 
 95. Act of Education § 2-9(3) (schools); Child Welfare Services Act § 5-9(3)(a) (other educational 
institutions); see also BITENSKY, supra note 5, at 166. 
 96. See  Schulorganisationsgesetz geregelten Schulen § 47(3) (1986) (in English: Teaching Act 
1986, § 47(3)). 
 97. See BITENSKY, supra note 5, at 171. 
 98. See id. 
 99. Allemeines Bürgeliches Gesetzbuch § 146a (in English: Austrian Civil Code, § 146a). 
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Austria also instituted an educational campaign intended to change the norms. 
In Austria, as in Scandinavia, some scholars claim that although the legislation 
is civil, parents, teachers, or others who are responsible for children can be 
indicted.100 The Austrian policy places strong emphasis on the welfare and 
education services and on the children’s ombudsman and less emphasis on 
literal enforcement of the law.101 
6. Germany 
In 2000 Germany enacted a civil statute stating that “[c]hildren have the 
right to be brought up without the use of force. Physical punishment, the 
causing of psychological harm and other degrading measures are forbidden.”102 
A nonpunitive, physical-contact defense exists for saving a child from danger, 
for example, from running into the street or for possessing matches.103 Like 
Austria, the German government and private bodies also invested extensively 
in an awareness campaign that included large posters on the streets, an 
explanatory booklet, and monthly distributions of leaflets on the development 
of children and ways for parents to avoid corporal punishment of children from 
birth until the age of five.104 Here too, scholars debated whether mild corporal 
punishment should be indictable.105 A further dispute concerned whether a 
criminal defense allowing parents to punish their children in general terms 
(applicable to corporal punishment administered prior to 2000) remained valid 
for moderate and reasonable punishment meant for educational purposes.106 As 
in Israel, the attorney general has discretion whether to bring charges, and light 
corporal punishment may be subject to the de minimis rule. In more serious 
cases, the prosecution may sometimes refrain from bringing charges against the 
parents if it is convinced that despite the public interest in bringing charges, 
proper therapeutic steps have been taken.107 
Of the sixteen federal states of German, thirteen have imposed a prohibition 
on corporal punishment in their educational systems.108 In the remaining three, 
corporal punishment is customary.109 No explicit legislation exists regarding day-
care centers.110 
 
 100. See BITENSKY, supra note 5, at 172. 
 101. See id. at 173. 
 102.  Inhalt und Grenzen der Personensorge, [Ostracism of Force in Upbringing Act], Aug. 18, 
1996, BGB, as amended, § 1631, ¶ 2 (unverified). 
 103. See BITENSKY, supra note 5, at 190. 
 104. Id. at 195. 
 105. See id. at 191–93. 
 106. See id. at 191. 
 107. See id. at 192–93. 
 108. Id. at 190. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See id. at 190. 
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The German ban on corporal punishment was less productive than the 
Swedish ban, possibly because the awareness campaign was less successful.111 
But Germany invested considerable resources in therapy by the state. It 
implements an impressive welfare mechanism, even if only theoretically, which 
acts in various ways to prevent conflicts within the family and to treat conflicts 
when they do occur. The government provides advice and implements programs 
for resolving the conflicts in nonviolent ways, all by virtue of the law.112 
D. States that Permit Parental Corporal Punishment but Prohibit Its Use 
byTeachers: The United Kingdom and the United States 
England permits corporal punishment by parents but has enacted a defense 
to its prohibition against assault in cases of corporal punishment,113 available 
only as long as the punishment comprises “reasonable chastisement.”114 
Qualifications (narrower than those of Canadian or Jewish law) limiting the 
corporal-punishment defense have been specified in court rulings, including  
(1) an assessment of the circumstances of the beating, (2) an assessment of the 
child’s strength and age (any beating a child over sixteen years of age is 
prohibited under all circumstances), (3) the duration of the beating, and (4) the 
severity of the beating.115 
Corporal punishment in the English public schools, though, was effectively 
prohibited in 1986.116 Although this prohibition did not apply to private 
schools,117 scholars have noted that, in any event, most state-supported schools 
have abandoned corporal punishment.118 
The situation in the United States is similar. The American Model Penal 
Code, which serves as the basis for criminal legislation in many states,119 permits 
parental corporal punishment as long as “[its purpose is] promoting the welfare 
of the minor” and the force is not excessive.120 
 
 111. See Gershoff & Bitensky, supra note 1, at 251–52. 
 112. See BITENSKY, supra note 5, at 190, 193–95. 
 113. Children and Young Persons Act, 1933, c. 12, § 1 sched. 7, amended in Children Act, 1989, c. 41 
(Eng.). 
 114. R. v. Hopley, (1860) 175 Eng. Rep. 1024, 1026 (court from which appeal was heard). 
 115. R. v. Woods, [1921] 85 J.P. 272 (court from which appeal was taken) (unverified). For a 
discussion of the decision of the European Court of Human Rights against the United Kingdom in A. v. 
United Kingdom, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 611 (1998), see Benjamin Shmueli, The Influence of the U.N. 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on Corporal Punishment—A Comparative Look, 10 OREGON 
REV. INT’L L. 189, 213–16 (2008). 
 116. Education (No. 2) Act, 1986, c. 61, § 48 (Eng.) (resulting in outlawing the cane, the tool 
commonly used for corporal punishment in schools). 
 117. Id. §§ 47–48. 
 118. Brenda Hale, Understanding Children’s Rights: Theory and Practice, 44 FAM. COURT REV. 350, 
351 (2006). 
 119. See Pollard, supra note 23, at 637–40. 
 120. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08, art. 3 (2001). See also Pollard, supra note 23, at 637. The specific 
provisions of criminal law are, of course, a matter of state jurisdiction. 
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As to parental corporal punishment, the U.S. Supreme Court has not 
considered whether parents have a fundamental constitutional right to use 
corporal punishment.121 Some sixteen states have enacted statutes that explicitly 
allow parents and guardians to use reasonable and moderate corporal 
punishment through a special, justification-based defense of parental discipline; 
in other states, court rulings achieve the same result.122 No state has prohibited 
corporal punishment within the family.123 All existing laws address parameters of 
reasonableness, moderation, and necessity according to the circumstances and 
the need for an educational goal. Among the reservations listed by various 
states is the readiness of the child to correct his ways and learn a lesson from 
the punishment, the age of the child, the child’s physical and mental state, the 
intensity of the force, and the necessity of the action.124 
Scholars have heavily criticized the posture toward corporal punishment in 
the United States, claiming that it is unconstitutional125 and that the United 
States should follow other countries that have banned corporal punishment.126 
These scholars have considered many studies showing that corporal punishment 
is not effective and harms the child as well as parent–child relations.127 Others 
 
 121. Mary Kate Kearney, Substantive Due Process and Parental Corporal Punishment: Democracy 
and the Excluded Child, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 3 (1995). 
 122. Dean Herman, A Statutory Proposal to Prohibit the Infliction of Violence upon Children, 19 
FAM. L.Q. 1, 11–12 (1985) (discussing the statutes limiting parental punishment and the interpretations 
of the courts); BITENSKEY, supra note 5, at 265. See Pollard, supra note 23, at 635–42 (discussing the 
rationales behind the different states’ statutes allowing parents and guardians to use reasonable and 
moderate punishment on their children). 
 123. See BITENSKY, supra note 5, at 270–75 (reviewing, inter alia, the special “intermediate 
situation” in Minnesota, where several statutes taken together indicate that so-called reasonable 
parental corporal punishment actually amounts to the criminal offense of assault); Kandice K. Johnson, 
Crime or Punishment: The Parental Corporal Punishment Defense —Reasonable and Necessary, or 
Excused Abuse?, U. ILL. L. REV. 413, 438–40 (1998) (describing the commonalities between all states’ 
parental privilege doctrines). 
 124. BITENSKY, supra note 5, at 266. See also Pollard, supra note 23, at 636–37. 
 125. See, e.g., Deana A. Pollard, Banning Corporal Punishment: A Constitutional Analysis, 52 AM. 
U. L. REV. 447 (2002). Pollard argues that the current state laws that exclude children from protection 
against assault and battery are unconstitutional and that therefore state legislatures should repeal laws 
that permit child corporal punishment and adopt laws prohibiting it. Pollard further argues that if states 
fail to take this action, courts should declare laws permitting child corporal punishment 
unconstitutional based on the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause. Pollard thinks that 
states could ban corporal punishment by invoking either their police power to protect society or their 
parens patriae power to protect children in particular, based on social science studies that demonstrate 
that corporal punishment causes harm to children, parents and society at large. She also argues that 
current state laws excluding children from protection against assault and battery are unconstitutional 
and that these laws violate children’s liberty interest in being free from physical invasion. Cf. Lynn Roy, 
Chalk Talk: Corporal Punishment in American Public Schools and the Rights of the Child, 30 J.L. & 
EDUC. 554, 563 (2001) (“It is time for federal courts to recognize that the state has no compelling 
interest in the educational sense of imposing punishment that causes either physical or psychological 
harm to a student.”). 
 126. Pollard, supra note 23, at 578. 
 127. See, e.g., Pollard, supra note 23, at 634–57 (arguing for the abolishment of the U.S. “parental 
discipline” defense, which is essentially a justification-based defense that operates to defend parents for 
even severe physical violence and injury to children). 
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think that there is a lack of uniformity amongst the states in construing the term 
“reasonableness,” sometimes even within the same state.128 
As in other countries, corporal punishment is treated differently in the 
educational system than in the home.129 In Goss v. Lopez, the U.S. Supreme 
Court agreed that some form of discipline may be necessary for a teacher to 
maintain order in the classroom.130 Discipline promotes learning.131 And in 
Ingraham v. Wright, a five-to-four majority ruled that without some form of 
disciplinary sanction for misbehavior, students who wish to learn may be 
unfairly deprived of that right.132 The Court ruled that the Eighth Amendment 
to the Constitution does not apply to school children, although they have a 
liberty interest in their bodily integrity, since the law provides adequate 
protection against due-process violations.133 According to the Court, corporal 
punishment does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment,134 nor does it violate the guarantee of liberty contained in the 
Fourteenth Amendment.135 
Ingraham has been subject to considerable criticism. Some scholars have 
argued that the Ninth Amendment provides a constitutional challenge to 
corporal punishment in public schools and that parents’ rights are a clear 
example of rights “retained by the people”: since parents are charged with the 
upbringing of their children, they retain an inherent right to discipline their 
children accordingly.136 According to this argument, the Ingraham court may 
have failed to consider the implications of the Ninth Amendment and the 
protection it may provide to children. These scholars maintain that corporal 
punishment in public schools unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents 
to direct the upbringing and education of their children. Punishment forces 
 
 128. Gershoff & Bitensky, supra note 1, at 247–48; Shmueli, supra note 5, at 78–79. 
 129. For the history of corporal punishment administered by parental and teachers in the United 
States, see IRWIN A. HYMAN & JAMES H. WISE, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN 
EDUCATION: READINGS IN HISTORY, PRACTICE AND ALTERNATIVES 23 (Irwin A. Hyman & James 
H. Wise eds., 1979); see also Pollard, supra note 23, at 579–80, 585–87 (discussing the statutes 
prohibiting corporal punishment in schools and the more rapid decline of its use in the school setting). 
 130. 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975). 
 131. Roy, supra note 125, at 556. 
 132. 430 U.S. 651, 682 (1977). 
 133. Compare id. at 669 with Cynthia Denenholz Sweeney, Corporal Punishment in Public Schools: 
A Violation of Substantive Due Process, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 1257 (1982) (examining cases in which 
the specific application of the corporal punishment, rather than the provision allowing the punishment, 
were challenged and suggesting a less strict test for determining the constitutionality of corporal 
punishment under due process). 
 134. 430 U.S. at 683. 
 135. In other words, it does not require schools to provide notice and a hearing before application of 
physical discipline. Id.; Sims v. Waln, 388 F. Supp. 543, 549 (S.D. Ohio 1974). See also Angela Bartman, 
Spare the Rod and Spoil the Child? Corporal Punishment in Schools Around the World, 13 IND. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 283, 307 (2002); Roy, supra note 125, at 560; Note, Corporal Punishment: For School 
Children Only, 27 DRAKE L. REV. 137, 158, 160 (1977–1978). 
 136. Comment, The Ninth Amendment: A Constitutional Challenge to Corporal Punishment in 
Public Schools, 55 KAN. L. REV. 429, 430–31 (2007) [hereinafter The Ninth Amendment]. 
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minor children to be subjected to abuse without parental input and within the 
compulsory setting of the public school. By forcing parents to accept the 
emotional and physical marks that corporal punishment leaves on their 
children, corporal punishment in public schools unconstitutionally abridges the 
parents’ right to direct the upbringing of their children. According to this 
argument, parents should thus have the right not to agree to the use of corporal 
punishment in public schools; any corporal punishment administered in public 
schools without such consent would be a violation of the Ninth Amendment. 
Because parents are nominally in control of educating their child’s behavior, 
they voluntarily choose whether the child should receive such discipline in the 
school.137 This argument may serve both perceptions, since if the parents support 
corporal punishment, teachers that carry out that punishment are fulfilling 
parents’ wishes and rights and not threatening them. 
Another criticism is that corporal punishment in public school disadvantages 
African American students, making them feel inferior (since such punishment is 
reminiscent of slavery), thereby stifling their intellectual growth while 
encouraging discrimination. Accordingly, Ingraham should be overturned and 
the Eight Amendment and the full ban on corporal punishment in public 
schools relitigated.138 In practice, more than half of the United States 
jurisdictions, including the District of Columbia, have so far chosen to prohibit 
corporal punishment in public elementary and secondary schools.139 Other states 
have left the matter to the discretion of the administration in each school,140 
while in others corporal punishment is permitted in a manner similar to that in 
the family unit. In many districts in some of the largest cities in the country, 
 
 137. Id. at 453–54. 
 138. Susan H. Bitensky, The Constitutionality of School Corporal Punishment of Children as a 
Betrayal of Brown v. Board of Education, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 201 (2004). For an argument that this 
discrimination violates the First Amendment, in addition to substantive due process, equal protection, 
and the free exercise of religion under that amendment, see Andre R. Imbrogno, Corporal Punishment 
in America’s Public Schools and the U.N. Convention on the Rights of The Child: A Case for 
Nonratification, 29 J.L. & EDUC. 125, 134–38 (2000) (adding to this proposal the use of parental choice 
to determine whether their children should be subject to corporal punishment in public schools, 
something that the courts have not allowed until now). Cf. Pollard, supra note 125, at 467–70, 473–81 
(suggesting that state laws banning corporal punishment would survive even “strict scrutiny” and arguing that 
laws that exclude children from protection against corporal punishment violate equal protection); see also 
Bitensky, supra at 214 (presenting data that shows that African American students are hit at a rate 
more than double their proportion of the population). 
 139. Only two states had done so by the end of the 1970s and only five states by 1986. BITENSKY, 
supra note 5, at 290; Pollard, supra note 23, at 586. For an updated list of states that prohibit corporal 
punishment in school, see Gershoff & Bitensky, supra note 1, at 259. See also Timothy Garrison, Part 
Two: Rights of Parents: From Parent to Protector: The History of Corporal Punishment in American 
Public Schools, 16 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 115, 115–19 (2007) (describing the history of corporal 
punishment in public schools and the gradual and partial shift from the in loco parentis doctrine as a 
justification for corporal punishment in public schools to the parens patriae doctrine, which justifies the 
use of corporal punishment as a means to further the state’s role as a protector and educator and the 
state’s interest in controlling children’s behavior and providing for their safety and security). 
 140. Warburg, supra note, 21 at 57. 
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corporal punishment has been prohibited.141 Most of the states (forty-two) do 
not allow corporal punishment in residential institutions and agency group 
homes; more than half of the states (thirty-nine) ban it in day-care centers; and 
about two-thirds (thirty-two states) ban it family-care centers.142 In private 
schools the situation differs according to the contract of each school with its 
students’ parents. Some of these contracts include an explicit clause allowing 
school staff to physically punish the pupils.143 
The situation in the U.S. educational system is consistent with public 
opinion: people’s approval of corporal punishment varies with the context; 
almost ninety percent of parents use it against their children, yet only about half 
the population supports corporal punishment in the public-education system.144 
Although some of the public approves of corporal punishment in the academic 
setting, scholars have criticized this situation, which allows corporal punishment 
in the educational system in some jurisdictions, and have called on the federal 
courts to intervene.145 
It seems that in the United States, prohibiting corporal punishment in 
schools and in the parents’ home depends greatly on social norms and the 
extent of the population’s readiness to accept this norm and assimilate it.146 The 
United States has not ratified the UNCRC. If one hopes for a genuine change in 
the attitude of the American people, the population is readier to embrace this 
shift in the educational system than in the family arena.147 
 
 141. Gershoff & Bitensky, supra note 1, at 246 (including school districts in Atlanta, Georgia; 
Dallas, Texas; Houston, Texas; Memphis, Tennessee; Miami, Florida; and Tucson, Arizona). 
 142. Id. at 247. 
 143. Anne Proffitt Dupre, Should Students Have Constitutional Rights? Keeping Order in Pubilc 
Schools, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 49, 88–90 (1996) (explaining the legal differences between private and 
public schools). 
 144. Murray A. Straus & Michael Donnelly, Theoretical Approaches to Corporal Punishment, in 
CORPORAL PUNISHMENT OF CHILDREN IN THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 3, 4 (Michael Donnelly & 
Murray A. Straus eds., 2005); Herman, supra note 122, at 12 (“As of 1970, over 90 percent of all 
American adults were subject to corporal punishment as youngsters and approximately the same 
percentage of today’s children face the same treatment.”); Pollard, supra note 23, at 581–83; Murray A. 
Straus, David B. Sugarman & Jean Giles-Sims, Spanking by Parents and Subsequent Antisocial 
Behavior of Children, 151 ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC ADOLESCENT MED. 761, 761 (1997). 
 145. See Jerry Parkinson, Federal Court Treatment of Corporal Punishment in Public Schools: 
Jurisprudence that Is Literally Shocking to the Conscience, 39 S.D. L. REV. 276, 310–11 (1994). 
 146. Warburg, supra note 21, at 65–66. 
 147. Imbrogno, supra note 138, at 144. 
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III 
CORPORAL PUNISHMENT METED OUT BY PARENTS VERSUS CORPORAL 
PUNISHMENT METED OUT BY TEACHERS 
A. First Perception: The Human-Rights and Children’s Rights Perspective and 
the UNCRC—Corporal Punishment by Parents and Teachers Should Be 
Totally Prohibited 
In modern society, increasingly unequivocal attitudes have been expressed 
against parental behavior that harms children, even that allegedly undertaken in 
the interest of the children, when this behavior inflicts damage on the children, 
violates their dignity, or is contrary to justice and equality.148 Unlike society’s 
traditional view of the family, this approach views the individual in the family 
unit and does not look at the family as a whole. The child is seen as an 
independent entity for almost all purposes, even at the expense of eroding the 
parents’ authority, despite the natural inequality inherent in the structure of the 
classic family unit, at the center of which are strong parents and weak children. 
The same structure applies to teachers and students. Children are physically 
weaker and psychologically more vulnerable than adults and therefore deserve 
a greater degree of protection. 
This first perspective follows from the human-rights approach. If the actions 
of the parents and educators harm the child, these actions should be restricted 
even if the adult is acting for the benefit of the child or student out of a positive 
educational motive.149 This approach attempts to shake off the traditional 
paternalistic attitudes that leave it to the adults to decide what is in the best 
interest of the child150—even if the paternalistic decision purports to be made in 
the name of the positive goal of forging children as independent human beings 
who understand boundaries and have learned to accept discipline and values. 
According to this human-rights approach, it is obvious that even mild corporal 
punishment meted out by parents and teachers should be totally prohibited, 
 
 148. This approach is based mainly on the views of liberal thinkers who believe that the rights of the 
individual have to supersede all else. See generally Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism and ‘The Politics of 
Recognition,’ in MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION (Amy Gutmann 
ed., 1992) (advocating a multicultural society that protects the rights of every individual based on 
recognition of their human dignify); see also JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATIES OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 
142–54 (1955) (discussing the duties of a parent to a child); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11–
16 (1971); John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF, 223–51 
(1985). 
 149. See generally C. Harry Hui, Measurement of Individualism-Collectivism, 22 J. OF RES. IN 
PERSONALITY 17, 17–36 (1988) (describing the differing attitudes of Chinese and American students 
towards individual rights versus collective good and discussing individualistic and collectivistic 
approaches). 
 150. See Michael D.A. Freeman, The Morality of Cultural Pluralism, 3 INT. J. OF CHILD. RTS. 1, 16–
17 (1995) (describing how pluralism must respond to cultures that allow parents to violate what we see 
as the rights of the child). 
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since the right to be free from violence is one of the basic human rights afforded 
to adults and is a right that children should also be granted.151 
The controversies regarding the legitimacy of corporal punishment as an 
educational tool and regarding its effectiveness have been raging for many 
generations, both among pedagogues and educators and among academics from 
social sciences and the law. Many behavioral-research studies describe the 
physical harm152 and emotional-behavioral disorders (antisocial, cognitive or 
developmental, psychological, and psychiatric) created by even light corporal 
punishment.153 Researchers also offer evidence of its ineffectiveness154 or that, at 
best, it is no more effective than other forms of punishment that carry less 
risk.155 These researchers argue that corporal punishment cannot be said to be 
effective, since correcting behavior immediately is different than teaching a 
child not to engage in the behavior again, so any perceived immediate 
effectiveness must be weighed against future problems.156 In addition, scholars 
have emphasized the damage caused to the parents as well,157 damage that 
passes down from generation to generation.158 Discipline serves as a common 
defense claim even in harsh cases,159 and sometimes spanking is a precursor for 
abuse.160 Scholars also point to inevitable societal harm that can result from 
violent behavior, including corporal punishment: family breakdown, violence, 
and illness.161 Some scholars raise policy considerations, arguing that even if 
spanking is not so harmful, banning it would encourage parents to find 
 
 151. ADAH MAURER, PADDLES AWAY: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF PHYSICAL PUNISHMENT IN 
SCHOOLS 133–34 (1981). 
 152. See, e.g., ALICE MILLER, FOR YOUR OWN GOOD: HIDDEN CRUELTY IN CHILD REARING 
AND THE ROOTS OF VIOLENCE 61, 65–66, 115–16, 232 (H. Hannum & H. Hannum trans., 1990) 
(explaining how corporal punishment leads to aggression, inability to express anger healthily, lack of 
empathy, and violence as adults); Peter Newell, Respecting Children’s Right to Physical Integrity—What 
the World Might be Like, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE CHILDREN’S RIGHTS—COMPARATIVE POLICY 
AND PRACTICE 224–25 (Bob Franklin ed., 1995). 
 153. PHILLIP GREVEN, SPARE THE CHILD: THE RELIGIOUS ROOTS OF PUNISHMENT AND THE 
PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF PHYSICAL ABUSE 193–98 (1990); HYMAN, supra note 1, at 19; Elizabeth 
Thompson Gershoff, Corporal Punishment by Parents and Associated Child Behaviors and Experiences: 
A Meta-analytic and Theoretical Review, 128 PSYCHOL. BULL. 539 (2002) (a comprehensive meta-
analysis of eighty-eight studies conducted over a period of sixty-two years); Joan McCord, Unintended 
Consequences of Punishment, 98 PEDIATRICS 832, 832 (1996); Pollard, supra note 23, at 594–608. 
 154. Pollard, supra note 23, at 596, 624–27; see also Gershoff & Bitensky, supra note 1, at 233–34 
(stating that studies have shown that in the short term the efficacy of corporal punishment is mixed, but 
in the long term it is not efficacious). 
 155. Pollard, supra note 125, at 449 & nn. 4-6. 
 156. Pollard, supra note 23, at 630. 
 157. Identified damage includes guilt, loss of parent-child bonding and affection, and harm to the 
integrity of the family unit. Gershoff & Bitensky, supra note 1, at 239–40 (discussing the erosion of the 
closeness in the parent–child relationship); Pollard, supra note 23, at 596–97, 610–12, 620–21. 
 158. Pollard, supra note 23, at 609–610. 
 159. See id. at 583–84 (bringing data regarding American society and the use of the discipline 
defense). Corporal punishment that does not rise to the level of child abuse is often referred to as 
“subabusive” corporal punishment. Pollard, supra note 125, at 449. 
 160. Gershoff & Bitensky, supra note 1, at 240–41; Pollard, supra note 23, at 583–84, 621–22. 
 161. Pollard, supra note 23, at 578. 
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alternative disciplinary methods that do not carry the risks associated with 
spanking.162 Indeed, scholars offer alternatives to corporal punishment, such as 
deprivation of privileges, reasoning, time-out, grounding, negotiation and 
compromise, asking the children themselves to come up with a fitting 
nonviolent punishment, holding the child, and letting the child suffer the logical 
consequences, within reason, of his acts.163 
Scholars note that corporal punishment administered by educators also 
harms children. It interferes with students’ ability to do schoolwork.164 Scholars 
point at more-effective disciplinary techniques for controlling children and 
teaching them moral values, such as expulsion, suspension, detention, parental 
pick-ups, time-outs, deprivation of privileges, and explaining why misbehavior 
is unacceptable.165 The story about the consequences of corporal punishment 
that my late grandmother experienced is a good example for this standpoint. 
If one sees a ban on corporal punishment as a child’s right, that is, focusing 
on the right of the child and not on the duty of the parent or teacher, there 
should be no difference between parents and teachers. Since this is the right of 
the child—not to be exposed to corporal punishment—this right will always vest 
irrespective of the identity of the adult and his role in the child’s life. The 
adult—the educator or parent—should, of course, be given authority to correct 
the child, but it should not be absolute and it must be withdrawn when it clashes 
with the child’s rights over his body and his dignity. 
Some scholars claim that the need to prohibit corporal punishment by both 
parents and teachers is derived, explicitly or implicitly, from the UNCRC.166 The 
UNCRC constitutes the summit of development for children’s rights in the 
international arena, emphasizing their rights to dignity and recognition as 
autonomous persons, effectively making them independent beings in terms of 
their rights, including their rights within the family.167 All UN members except 
the United States and Somalia have signed and ratified the UNCRC.168 
Does the UNCRC ban the use of light, educational corporal punishment?169 
Some scholars claim that because the UNCRC specifically mentions only 
“violence” or “abuse,” but not “corporal punishment,” it does not and must not 
 
 162. See id. at 629. 
 163. BITENSKY, supra note 5, at 2–3; see STRAUS & DONNELLY, supra note 1, at 150 (reviewing 
social-science experiments on the effectiveness of various forms of punishment). 
 164. Bitensky, supra note 138, at 211. 
 165. Id. 
 166. See Bartman, supra note 135, at 294–96; Gershoff & Bitensky, supra note 1, at 242–43 (both 
pointing also to other international documents giving rise to a ban on corporal punishment). 
 167. Stephen J. Toope, The Convention on the Rights of the Child: Implications for Canada, in 
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 33, 41–43, 47–48 (Michael Freeman ed., 1996). 
 168. See Imbrogno, supra note 138, at 138–46 (discussing the possible impact of ratification on the 
American public). 
 169. For an extensive discussion, see Shmueli, supra note 115, at 197–209. 
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prohibit corporal punishment.170 Others insist that the UNCRC purposely 
establishes only a minimum standard in the hope that all states parties will 
indeed comply with it, rather than set an upper threshold that some states 
parties would be unlikely to reach.171 Still other scholars claim that the UNCRC 
does explicitly prohibit corporal punishment and that it can constitute a human-
rights violation.172 Opinions as to the specific article of the UNCRC from which 
this ban is derived differ.173Article 19(1) is the main article ascribed to corporal 
punishment. It states, 
States Parties shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and 
educational measures to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental 
violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, 
including sexual abuse, while in the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s) or any other 
person who has the care of the child. 
Even assuming the UNCRC prohibits mild corporal punishment, whether 
such mild punishment not causing injury is included in the term “violence” is 
also debated.174 It is a matter of interpretation, although it may be assumed that 
 
 170. Susan Kilbourne, Opposition to U.S. Ratification of the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child: Responses to Parental Rights Arguments, 4 LOY. POVERTY L.J. 55, 95–96 (1998). 
 171. Ruth Lawsurence-Karski, Legal Rights of the Child: The U.S. and U.N. Convention of the 
Rights of the Child, 4 INT’L J. CHILD. RTS. 19, 41 (1996). 
 172. See BITENSKY, supra note 5, at 48–49, 53–56; Pollard, supra note 23, at 592. 
 173. Article 37(a) provides that no child shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading punishment. Some scholars think that this is a ground for a ban on corporal punishment. See, 
e.g., Nicola Taylor, International Law, in THE DISCIPLINE AND GUIDANCE OF CHILDREN: MESSAGES 
FROM RESEARCH 10 (Anne B. Smith, Megan Gollop, Nicola J. Taylor & Kate Marshall eds., 2005); see 
also BITENSKY, supra note 5, at 59–63 (discussing Article 37(a) and it varying possible interpretations). 
For other articles that are consistent with a ban on corporal punishment, see id. at 63–75. It seems that 
Article 37(a) applies specifically to punishment imposed by the authorities rather than to that exercised 
by parents. Others think that Article 24(3), which instructs states to take measures to safeguard the 
health of children, also provides a basis for a prohibition on corporal punishment. See Ezer, supra note 
15, at 161 (discussing the Committee’s belief that Article 24(3) supports a ban of corporal punishment); 
Taylor, supra, at 92. 
 174. Shmueli, supra note 115, at 207–10. For different opinions, see BITENSKY, supra note 5, at 53–
56. Some scholars strongly support the view that Article 19(1) does lay down an explicit prohibition on 
corporal punishment. Id.; Michael Freeman, Children are Unbeatable, 13 CHILD. & SOC’Y 130, 135 
(1999); Taylor, supra note173, at 87. According to Article 44 of the UNCRC, the states parties must 
submit periodic reports to the Committee on the Rights of the Child regarding their actions to ensure 
children’s rights under the UNCRC. The committee calls on states parties to apply the provisions of the 
UNCRC. It also supervises the progress of the states parties in implementing the UNCRC by making 
recommendations in response to the states’ periodic reports. In addition, the committee publishes 
general comments and organizes conferences on topics related to the interpretations of provisions of 
the UNCRC. It has rejected any interpretation that the UNCRC does not prohibit corporal 
punishment. See, e.g., Freeman, supra at 136 (quoting the UNCRC). The committee has interpreted 
Article 19(1) as a cornerstone and other articles (like Article 28(2), which imposes a responsibility on 
the state to ensure that school discipline is administered in a manner consistent with the child’s human 
dignity and in conformity with the present convention) as clearly prohibiting light corporal punishment 
in both the family and educational contexts. See, e.g., U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General 
Comment No. 8, ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/8 (Mar. 2, 2007). The Committee has also required states 
parties to adjust their national law to this interpretation. See U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, 
Report on the 17th Session, ¶ 63, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/34 (Nov. 8, 1994); U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the 
Child, Violence against Children within the Family and in Schools, ¶ 715, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/34 (Sept. 
28, 2001); U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Convention on the Rights of the Child, Annex IX: 
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the human-rights approach derived from the convention’s provisions supports 
banning rather than permitting it. Some states have used the UNCRC as an 
international source to support the ban, while others have taken the view that 
they can permit the use of corporal punishment despite the UNCRC.175 
Most countries are signatories to the UNCRC and have ratified it. By doing 
so, the international community has expressly recognized the need to protect 
children from the harmful effects of violence, and it thus seems that from a 
human-rights perspective, school children should receive the same type of 
protection,176 this being the right of every child, a right that imposes a 
concomitant duty on both parents and teachers. 
B. Second Perception: The Discipline-and-Correction Perspective—Moderate 
and Reasonable Corporal Punishment by Parents and Teachers Should Be 
Permitted 
Advocates of the second perception believe that corporal punishment as a 
means of education can be effective if it is qualified in a manner designed to 
lessen the harm to the child. The education of children can be carried out in a 
variety of ways, including coercion and corporal punishment. The educator—
parent or teacher—hurts the child in order to correct him, usually because the 
child misbehaved, acted wrongfully, did not obey instructions, or rejected 
authority. This type of punishment is commonly considered to be a deterrent, 
aimed at stopping the child from repeating his misconduct. It is designed to 
shape the child’s character. Thus it teaches obedience and respect for 
authority.177 
 
General Comment No. 1 (2001)–Article 29(1): The Aims of Education, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. CRC/GC/2001/1 
(Apr. 17, 2001); U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations of the Comm. on the 
Rights of the Child: Zimbabwe, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add. 55 (June 7, 1996); U.N. Comm. on the 
Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations of the Comm. on the Rights of the Child: United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, ¶ 31, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/ 15/Add. 34 (Feb. 15, 1995). See also 
BITENSKY, supra note 5, at 120–21; Rachel Hodgkin & Peter Newell, United Nations Children’s Fund, 
THE IMPLEMENTATION HANDBOOK FOR THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 242–47 
(1998); Peter Newell, The Human Rights Imperative for Ending All Corporal Punishment of Children, 
in ELIMINATING CORPORAL PUNISHMENT: THE WAY FORWARD TO CONSTRUCTIVE CHILD 
DISCIPLINE 25, 25–48 (Stuart N. Hart ed., 2005). The committee’s conclusions are merely 
recommendations, and its interpretation is not binding. Its conclusions, however, should be regarded at 
least as a complementary authority because the committee is the official and the highest interpreter of 
the UNCRC. An examination of the committee’s interpretations and its contacts with the various 
countries shows that even though the UNCRC enables the states parties to choose whether to prohibit 
all forms of physical abuse in criminal or family law, it specifically adopts the common approach of the 
Scandinavian countries (the civil approach) and encourages states parties to do the same. See U.N. 
Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Guidelines Regarding the Form and Contents of Periodic 
Reports to Be Submitted by States Parties Under Article 44, Paragraph 1(b) of the Convention, ¶ 88, 
U.N. Doc. CRC/C/58 (Nov. 20, 1996). 
 175. See Shmueli, supra note 115, at 238–42. 
 176. Bartman, supra note 135, at 296. Some see a ban on corporal punishment that is derived from 
Article 28(2) of the UNCRC, which refers to schools. See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
May 15, 2006, Committee on the Rights of the Child, CRC/C/GC/8, at paras. 7, 19–22 (March 2, 2007). 
 177. GREVEN, supra note 153, at 8. 
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Some behavioral studies show that light corporal punishment, if carried out 
thoughtfully and nonsystematically, will not necessarily cause mental or 
physical harm to the child; even if there is minimal harm, it pales in comparison 
to the efficacy of the punishment in terms of the child’s education in the long 
and short term,178 and some researchers view such light corporal punishment as 
harmless and even beneficial.179 
Social-sciences research presents a series of qualifications on the use of light 
corporal punishment that are very similar to those prevailing in Canadian, 
Jewish, English, and American law. One interesting opinion is that espoused by 
Diana Baumrind, a child-developmental psychologist who for many years 
argued consistently that even mild corporal punishment was harmful. In 1996 
her approach changed, and she has since published several studies showing that 
physical punishment is not harmful and can even be beneficial.180 In Baumrind’s 
opinion, corporal punishment for the purpose of inculcating discipline in a child, 
when administered sensibly, can actually establish correct social behavior and 
better prepare the child for life while protecting him from sudden exposure to 
negative and painful experiences and behaviors occurring outside the family 
arena. According to Baumrind, if a child grows up in a “hothouse” in which the 
parents fail to react in the face of bad behavior or use “soft” and insufficiently 
effective alternatives to counter it, the child is, in the end, hurt, since outside 
this “hothouse” he will be exposed to harsh negative reactions to such behavior 
without any preparation.181 Baumrind’s research also challenges the argument 
that light corporal punishment leads to an intergenerational cycle of violence. 
In her view, children’s violence can stem not only from exaggerated corporal 
punishment but also from the failure to use it at all. She also presents data 
according to which children whose parents physically punished them mildly 
were less violent vis-à-vis others.182 
Baumrind sets clear limits and restraints on the use of corporal punishment. 
Although she claims that she personally opposes the hitting of children as an 
 
 178. See, e.g., Diana Baumrind, Response, A Blanket Injunction Against Disciplinary Use of 
Spanking Is Not Warranted by the Data, 98 PEDIATRICS 828, 829 (1996) (arguing that corporal 
punishment is more effective than the alternatives); Diana Baumrind, Parenting: The Discipline 
Controversy Revisited, 45 FAM. REL. 405, 413 (1996); Diana Baumrind, Robert E. Larzelere & Philip A. 
Cowan, Ordinary Physical Punishment: Is It Harmful? Comment on Gershoff (2002), 128 PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 580, 585 (2002); Marjorie Lindner Gunnoe & Carrie Lea Mariner, Toward a Developmental-
Contextual Model of the Effects of Parental Spanking on Children’s Aggression, 151 ARCHIVE OF 
PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 768, 773–74 (1997); Pollard, supra note 23, at 627–34 (asserting 
arguments in support of corporal punishment); Straus & Donnelly, supra note 144, at 4 (bringing the 
argument of the efficacy of corporal punishment). 
 179. Robert E. Larzelere, Presentation, A Review of the Outcomes of Parental Use of Nonabusive or 
Customary Physical Punishment, 98 PEDIATRICS 824, 824 (1996) (reaching this outcome after 
examining thirty relevant studies published between 1974 and 1995). 
 180. See Baumrind, Larzelere & Cowen, supra note 178, at 585; Baumrind, A Blanket Injunction, 
supra note 178, at 829; Baumrind, Parenting, supra note 178, at 413. 
 181. Baumrind, Parenting, supra note178, at 406–10. 
 182. See id. at 583–84. 
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educational method,183 her research shows that the occasional use of a smack on 
the backside of a young child within a loving family, does not cause any long-
term emotional or mental damage, and sometimes it is even a necessary tool in 
educating children, particularly those between the ages of eighteen months to 
six years. Baumrind states the following limits and restrictions that make mild 
corporal punishment legitimate:184 The punishment should be an occasional, 
infrequent smack, defined as a light and controlled blow and not a serious 
beating to the child’s backside (avoiding more-sensitive organs), and 
administered only for the imposition of discipline. According to Baumrind, 
smacking is effective for forming the conduct of children aged eighteen months 
to six years if it does not take place out of anger or rejection but in a loving 
family atmosphere with warm and supportive relationships. 
All of this is true for the educational system as well, since the teacher is in 
loco parentis.185 In that setting, scholars also argue that corporal punishment 
teaches children to learn, to obey, and to respect the authority of others and 
that it builds the character of the students.186 It is consistent with “the right of all 
students to receive an education uninterrupted by a single, individual, 
disruptive student,”187 and it is preferable to harmful alternatives like 
suspension.188 An educational means that harms a child excessively or is proven 
to be ineffective should, in any event, be forbidden. So long as the benefit is the 
inculcation of boundaries and frameworks, expressed in measured and 
moderate methods of education and punishment, the benefits of such physical 
punishment will outweigh any immediate harm to the child’s psyche. 
This approach is certainly paternalistic, for it calculates what is in the 
interest of the child from the point of view of his education and normal 
development in both the short and long term. 
C. Third Perception: Only Teachers Should Be Subject to a Criminal Prohibition 
Against Corporal Punishment 
Due to differences between corporal punishment meted out by parents as 
opposed to teachers, it should be a criminal offense only for teachers. There are 
several reasons for this argument; some relate solely to the special structure of 
the family unit and the unique role played by parents in raising and educating 
 
 183. See Diana Baumrind, Invited Address at the 109th Annual Convention of the Convention of 
the American Psychological Association: Does Causally Relevant Research Support a Blanket 
Injunction Against Spanking by Parents? 12 (Aug. 24, 2001), (transcript available at http:// 
prdupl02.ynet.co.il/ForumFiles/12221272.pdf). 
 184. Baumrind, Parenting, supra note 178, at 413. See also Diana Baumrind, supra note 183. 
 185. See Imbrogno, supra note 138, at 130–31. 
 186. Leonard P. Edwards, Corporal Punishment and the Legal System, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
983, 990 (1996). 
 187. Lansing K. Reinholz, A Practical Defense of Corporal Punishment in the Schools, in 
CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN EDUCATION: READINGS IN HISTORY, PRACTICE AND 
ALTERNATIVES 346 (Irwin A. Hyman & James H. Wise eds., 1979). 
 188. Id. at 343. 
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their children, which totally differs from that of teachers, and some relate to the 
problems arising from the possibility that teachers will use corporal punishment. 
1. Legal Intervention in the Family’s Privacy: Affairs and Autonomy Versus 
the Need to Accord Parents Wide Authority when Disciplining Their 
Children 
The family is the most fundamental, basic, and important unit of society.189 It 
is an intimate unit in which the relationships between its members are 
important and fragile. Preserving its autonomy, harmony, and privacy whenever 
possible, especially in an era of eroding traditional family values, is critical. 
In addition, the family unit has a special status in international law. A 
number of conventions recognize the unique role of the family unit and the 
protection that society and the state should grant it, together with the need to 
maintain caution when intervening in its affairs. These conventions grant every 
person the basic right to establish a family, to belong to a family, and to marry,190 
along with the right of the child to belong to a family unit and to be protected 
by it.191 Several articles in the UNCRC also emphasize the importance of a 
child’s rearing and upbringing in a family framework and the efforts that every 
state party should make in order to guarantee it.192 Some of these conventions 
strongly emphasize the dignity that society must accord the family unit193 and the 
need for the family to be free of arbitrary interference in its affairs194 unless that 
interference is compatible with the law in a democratic society and the need to 
defend societal and state interests.195 From this approach, one may understand 
 
 189. European Social Charter, art. 16, Oct. 18, 1961, Europ. T.S. No. 35. 
 190. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 16, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess. U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 12, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights [ICCPR], art. 23, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), at 52, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, 
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966); American Convention on Human Rights, art. 17, Nov. 21, 1969, 
O.A.S. T.S. No. 36; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 18, June 27, 1981, 1520 
U.N.T.S. 217; Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [ICESCR], art. 15, Nov. 17, 1988, O.A.S. T.S. No. 69. 
 191. See, e.g., ICCPR, art. 24, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), at 52, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, 
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966); American Convention on Human Rights, art. 19, Nov. 21, 1969, 
O.A.S. T.S. No. 36; ICESCR, art. 16, Nov. 17, 1988, O.A.S. T.S. No. 69. 
 192. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 10, 20, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. 
GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Nov. 20, 1989). See also the introduction to the 
UNCRC. 
 193. Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 8(1), Nov. 4, 
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
 194. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 12, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, UN GAOR, 3d Sess. 
U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 195. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 
8(2), 12, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; ICESCR, art. 15(2), Nov. 17, 1988, O.A.S. T.S. No. 69. Article 
16 of the first part of the 1961 European Social Charter emphasizes the family’s right to “appropriate 
social, legal and economic protection to ensure its full development.” European Social Charter, art. 16, 
Oct. 18, 1961, Europ. T.S. No. 35; Article 18(2) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
even states that “[t]he state shall have the duty to assist the family which is the custodian of morals and 
traditional values recognized by the community.” African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 
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the need to give parents wide authority and liberty when disciplining their 
children. Parents face various difficult situations and should therefore be given 
authority that exceeds that given to teachers. True, both parents and teachers 
are responsible for the child’s education; but only the parent is really 
responsible for the child’s upbringing and turning him into person who will 
comply with social norms. 
This perception focuses on the family unit rather than on the individual and 
allows the family unit greater room to act naturally and freely. The objective of 
this approach is to grant legitimacy to moderate parental behavior that is in the 
interest of the child even if the child does not always understand that this is the 
case. Consequently, this approach holds that the parents’ actions are not to be 
restricted, nor their authority prejudiced or their discretion limited, as long as 
the benefit achieved by their behavior surpasses the damage inflicted and the 
motive for the behavior was educational. The child is indeed an independent 
entity, but he is not always capable of differentiating between good and bad, 
and it is the parent’s role to direct and guide him since he cannot be granted 
absolute autonomy when making decisions. Corporal punishment is, then, only 
a means and not a goal. This approach favors increased parental authority, 
expressed in a more forgiving and understanding attitude towards the use of an 
educational method such as corporal punishment, which on occasion is 
warranted, as long as it is practiced in a measured and moderate manner. This is 
not tantamount to encouraging blows for the sake of education. 
All this is true only for parents, only in the family sphere. Teachers should 
have other means to assert authority. Notably, the UNCRC encourages the 
autonomy only of parents when educating their children. Even if Article 19(1) 
of the UNCRC is construed as forbidding all violence against children, it must 
be read together with other articles of the UNCRC that impose a responsibility 
and obligation on parents to educate and direct their children, such as Article 5 
(which refers States Parties to respect the responsibilities, rights, and duties of 
parents and to provide them, in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities 
of the child, appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of 
the rights in the Convention), and Article 18 (which deals with the basic notion 
of parents being responsible for their children and refers States Parties to 
render appropriate assistance to parents in the performance of their child-
rearing responsibilities), and that safeguard the best interest of the children, 
such as Article 3 (that sets the best interest of the child as a primary principle) 
and Article 18(1) (that emphasizes the role of States Parties to use their best 
efforts to ensure recognition of the principle that both parents have common 
responsibilities for the upbringing and development of the child). Read thus, 
Article 19 does not bar educational corporal punishment but bars only violence 
 
18(2), June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217; This charter emphasizes the obligation of every family member 
(not only that of the state and society) toward the family unit, which includes the obligation “to 
preserve the harmonious development of the family.” African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
art. 27(1), 29(1), June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217. 
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committed for extraneous purposes.196 There are no similar provisions in 
relation to teachers. 
Court rulings likewise strongly emphasize the importance of the need for 
parental autonomy and authority.197 The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld 
parental rights as constitutionally protected and has stated that parents have a 
right to control the education of their children, since educational choices are 
fundamental to the family.198 Parents play a central role in the affirmative 
process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring, and their role is “essential to the 
growth of young people into mature, socially responsible citizens.”199 The Court 
has held that the right to bring up children is fundamental, so parents, who 
nurture their children and direct their destiny, have both the right and the duty 
to recognize and prepare them for additional obligations.200 In addition to 
 
 196. For further discussion, see Shmueli, supra note 115, at 203–04. 
 197. The majority in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000) wrote, 
[T]he interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children . . . is perhaps the 
oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court . . . . “[T]he history and 
culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture 
and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their 
children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition[.]” 
(quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972)). 
Earlier Supreme Court decisions similarly emphasize parents’ rights. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 
390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (“[C]onstitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents’ 
claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic to the structure 
of society.”); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“It is cardinal with us that the custody, 
care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include 
preparation for obligations the state can either supply or hinder.”). For a lower-court decision doing 
likewise, see Doe v. Irwin, 41 F. Supp. 1247, 1251 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (“[T]he right of parents to care, 
custody and nurture of their children is of such a character that it cannot be denied without violating 
those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political 
institutions.”). Justice Meir Shamgar, President of the Israeli Supreme Court, echoed these American 
decisions: 
The right of parents to raise and educate their children as they see fit is a fundamental 
constitutional right. This is a natural right which is derived from the relations between parents 
and their children . . . . It is the right of parents to have custody over their children and rear 
them . . . . This right is expressed in the privacy of the family and in its autonomy: parents are 
autonomous in making decisions for their children—about their education, way of life, etc. . . . 
Intervention by society and the state in these decisions is an exception requiring justification . . 
. . Greater intervention by the state, through the courts, in the decisions of parents vis-à-vis 
their children . . . grants the child a stronger standing within the family. The end of this process 
is that it will also hurt the children themselves, for it has to be remembered that the logic of 
the autonomy approach holds that the parents are the best decision makers for their children. 
The concern is that undermining [the parents’] status in one context will undermine the entire 
family relationship. 
(quote is the author’s translation) CA 2266/93 Anon. v. Anon [1993] 49(1) IsrSC 221, 237–38, 260–61 
(unverified). 
 198. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923). 
 199. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 637–39 (1979). 
 200. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). 
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recognizing the rights and duties of parents, the Court has recognized the 
“private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.”201 
Naturally, however, these rights and this autonomy have boundaries: the 
parental right to raise a child is not absolute:202 the state may, and sometimes 
must, limit those rights.203 The state can do so under the concept of parens 
patriae—a state’s duty to take care of children and to protect them when the 
parent does not act in their best interest and when children are incapable of 
protecting themselves.204 The state must bear in mind the unique status of the 
family unit and the need to avoid prejudice to its autonomy, harmony, and 
privacy insofar as it is possible; the state must also consider society and the law 
as a representative of society, and be careful when choosing the situations in 
which there is real cause to intervene in the family unit. The state should do 
whatever is possible to strengthen the family framework, refraining from 
interfering, when possible, in the privacy of the family—that is to say, in the 
parents’ right to raise their children as they choose.205 
Under this approach, some matters are subject to legal intervention, for 
example, abuse, maltreatment, and neglect. But balance must be sought, and 
not all conduct should be legally prohibited, even if it is controversial, like mild 
and reasonable corporal punishment.206 In other words, even if moderate 
corporal punishment entails some harm to the child, the sanctity of the family 
unit and the problematic nature of intervention in its affairs may ultimately 
prove to be more harmful to the family unit, to the parents, and even to the 
children. It is not only about narrowing parental autonomy ex ante. Ex post 
legal sanctions against parents, like imprisonment, may harm their children and 
the family unit as well, so here, too, balance is important. 
Indeed, there are scholars who believe that it is possible to preserve the 
parental privilege of corporal punishment of a child, without harming the child’s 
right to bodily integrity.207 
Justice Binnie’s opinion from the Canadian Supreme Court’s split decision 
in Canadian Foundation for Children sums up this point.208 Justice Binnie 
 
 201. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 447 (1990) (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 
166 (1944)). 
 202. Pollard, supra note 125, at 454 and the references therein. 
 203. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166; In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1377 (Utah 1980). 
 204. Patrick Henigan, Is Parental Authority Absolute? Public High Schools Which Provide Gay and 
Lesbian Youth Services Do Not Violate the Constitutional Childrearing Right of Parents, 62 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1261, 1278–79 (1996), and the references there; Pollard, supra note 125, at 456. 
 205. Straus & Donnelly, supra note 144, at 182–86 (drawing lessons from the Swedish law but 
explaining how the differences between American and European culture should limit drawing direct 
parallels). 
 206. Cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 676 (1977) (permitting corporal punishment in schools 
under the U.S. Constitution). Parents’ rights, including the right to corporally punish their children, are 
also protected by the Ninth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. 
IX. 
 207. Johnson, supra note 123. 
SHMUELI 10/25/2010 12:56:04 PM 
Spring 2010]       EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM VS. PARENTS: A COMPARATIVE VIEW 315 
concurred with the majority respecting parents and with the minority opinion 
respecting teachers: section 43 of the Canadian Criminal Code that permits 
moderate and reasonable parental and teachers’ corporal punishment is 
balanced respecting parents, but its application cannot be justified respecting 
teachers or anyone else acting in loco parentis. Justice Binnie maintained that it 
was possible to understand the state’s reluctance to intervene in the family unit 
but that this reluctance was less appropriate in the educational-system context. 
The teacher plays a role different from that of the parent in the life of the child. 
In the justice’s opinion, correct punishment in the educational system occurs 
primarily through restraining a student or sending him out of the classroom. 
2. Love, Intimacy, and Drawing a Line Between Mild Corporal  Punishment 
and Abuse 
Parents love their children and are more attached to them than teachers are 
to their students. It is assumed that parents know what is best for their child, so 
they are aware of the line between mild corporal punishment and abuse. True, 
it is sometimes hard to draw this line, and corporal punishment may deteriorate 
into abuse if not carried out correctly.209 But one can rely more on parents to 
recognize this line than on teachers—even though sometimes parents do abuse 
their children.210 In any case, parent–child abuse is the exception and should be 
treated separately and should not influence the parent’s use of light and 
moderate corporal punishment. 
The relationship of parental love and closeness to the child does not exist 
between teachers and their students. The teacher should not be permitted to 
corporally punish his students, as there is a greater likelihood that his actions 
will cause greater harm to the child than would the actions of a parent. When 
the punishment is physical, the authority must know the personality, nature, 
qualities and character of the child and so be able to assess his mental and 
physical strength and his willingness to change his ways as a result of the 
spanking. Today’s teachers may not have the individual interaction and 
intimacy necessary to make the appropriate decisions about physical 
punishment. Contemporary teacher–student relationships are different from 
those of the past. Contemporary teachers spend just a few hours a week in a 
classroom often comprising thirty or forty students. Contact with any particular 
student may last for only a year or two. Under such conditions it is almost 
impossible for the teacher to really get to know each student. In some schools, 
mainly private institutions and boarding schools, the situation may be slightly 
different, but one may conclude that even busy parents know their child better 
than the teachers of today. 
 
 208. Canadian Found. for Children, Youth and the Law v. Attorney General, [2002] 154 O.A.C. 144, 
O.A.C. Lexis 36 (Can.). 
 209. See, e.g., Pollard, supra note 23, at 621. 
 210. Cf. Pollard, supra note 125, at 486 (asserting that parents sometimes do not act in their child’s 
best interest). 
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3. Teachers No Longer in Loco Parentis Regarding Corporal Punishment 
It is difficult to assert that contemporary teachers are really in loco parentis 
insofar as knowing the child and exercising corporal punishment on him is 
concerned.211 Additionally, modern parents are generally intensively involved in 
the educational system and at least some of them do not agree that teachers 
should spank their children. Therefore, the presumption that a parent 
necessarily delegates his right to the teacher to corporally punish the child no 
longer exists. Each situation must be examined on its merits. In some private 
schools parents sign a contract in which they explicitly agree to delegate this 
authority; in other public or private schools this is not the case. 
4. Spanking a Student in Public or in Front of Classmates 
Spanking a child in a supermarket or in a mall in front of strangers may 
definitely be humiliating, but this punishment in a class or in the schoolyard in 
front of the student’s classmates and friends is much more so. It seriously 
violates the child’s dignity. This is an additional reason for not allowing this 
type of punishment to be given by teachers and for the need that they use less 
humiliating alternatives. Some court rulings hold that spanking in public is so 
humiliating that it amounts to child abuse per se;212 some of courts have 
convicted teachers who did not even physically touch the students.213 
5. Expertise Available to Teachers in Handling Children Without 
Exercising Corporal Punishment 
Teachers, more than parents, should learn to handle different situations in 
which a child needs correction. This is their job; they take it on freely, and they 
have (or should have) organized instruction and training in order to face 
difficult situations in school. They learn to use alternatives to corporal 
punishment. Teachers can also be assisted by school psychologists and 
 
 211. Cf. Canadian Found. for Children, Youth and the Law v. Attorney General, [2002] 154 O.A.C. 
144, O.A.C. LEXIS 36, 3 (Can.) (Binnie, J., Dissenting). Under the Jewish law approach, in order to 
fulfill some of the cumulative reservations, the educator must really know the child—his age, character, 
and the degree of his readiness to accept the reproof, et cetera. If the educator finds that, in principle, 
the circumstances permit striking the child, he must consider how to carry out the punishment in order 
for it to be compatible with the serious of qualifications listed above. Parents would find it difficult to 
fulfill all these cumulative conditions, and teachers even more so. It is arguable that preschool and 
kindergarten teachers know the children in their charge, certainly more than an elementary or high-
school school teacher would; but spanking in these ages is both dangerous and inefficient. Some 
important Jewish law sages and arbiters have declared that nowadays the permission given to teachers 
to inflict corporal punishment should be narrower than that given to parents, although it is questionable 
whether teachers should be given any such permission at all, since that permission is based on the 
assumption that the educator spends most of the day with the student and is familiar with him—
whereas the teacher is now no longer really in loco parentis regarding spanking. See Rabbi Haim David 
Halevy, supra note 39; see Responsa Igrot Moshe, YD 4:30, 1:140 (unverified); supra II.A. 
 212. See CrimA 6274/98 Anon v. Israel [2000] IsrSC 52(2) 293; CrimA. 1110/00 Israel v. Anon [2000] 
IsrSC 54(5) 229; CrimA 5598/99 Anon v. Israel [2000] IsrSC 54(5) 1; CrimA 405/03 Anon v. Israel, 
[2004] 67 Dinim Elion 270 (unverified). 
 213. See, e.g., Cr.F. (Mag. TA) 1360/97 Israel v. Aziz [1998] (unpublished, dated July 7, 1998); Cr.F. 
(Mag. TA) 5616/00 Israel v. Peleg [2001] Tak-Shal 01(2) 150 (unverified). 
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counselors,214 whereas parents must pay for these services and sometimes are 
not aware that they exist at all or have no belief in them. 
Teachers, being a part of an organized system (public or even private), with 
its rules and instructions, do not have license to hit any more than professors in 
a university can hit rude students who disturb the class, even if it can be shown 
that such physical punishment would be effective. 
Nor do parents have unlimited license to punish their children corporally by 
virtue of their parenthood. There are no organized systems that instruct 
parents. Only some parents obtain advice from the media or from parental 
counselors. This does not mean that society and the law must show 
permissiveness to any parental conduct, but if the conduct is not (so) harmful 
and has an educational purpose, some distinction should be drawn in this 
respect between parents and teachers. Teachers are given more tools to handle 
difficult situations, so society expects more from them. 
6. Teachers as Role Models and Taking Students’ Violence into Account 
That society expects more from teachers leads to another important 
explanation. Teachers have a tremendous power over the lives of children and 
are seen as role models in society.215 Teachers should therefore set themselves 
up as an example to their students and be of good moral character.216 Children 
learn behavior and practices by watching adults, and teachers have 
psychologically powerful relationships with children. Thus, teachers have the 
opportunity to either uphold the positive principles set in the home or to 
destroy them.217 
All this is hard to achieve when teachers themselves lose their tempers and 
strike out. Since violence is a learned behavior, children can imitate the 
aggressive behavior of the teacher.218 Scholars argue that corporal punishment 
by teachers is counterproductive: instead of teaching the students the value of 
settling problems peacefully, it teaches them to solve problems aggressively by 
exercising force against weaker parties.219 Corporal punishment thus undermines 
the image of the teacher as an example of reasoned behavior and creative 
problem-solving.220 
This is especially true and significant in these times of aggravated violence 
by students against teachers and especially against classmates—that is, 
bullying.221 Teachers have to play their role in dowsing the fires. It is almost 
 
 214. Bitensky, supra note 138, at 212. 
 215. Bartman, supra note 135, at 289–90. 
 216. Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925). 
 217. The Ninth Amendment, supra note 136, at 455. 
 218. See Imbrogno, supra note 138, at 131. 
 219. See Bartman, supra note 135, at 289–90. 
 220. RONALD T. HYMAN & CHARLES H. RATHBONE, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN SCHOOLS: 
READING THE LAW, NATIONAL ORGANIZATION ON LEGAL PROBLEMS OF EDUCATION 20 (1993). 
 221. See, e.g., The Ninth Amendment, supra note 136, at 434. 
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impossible to fight this phenomenon using violence. The teacher who hits his 
students cannot be providing a good personal example; the result is that the 
students will not respect him and will reject adult authority.222 This argument 
may apply to parents as well, but, as noted, society expects more from teachers 
because of their organized training and their role as educators and providers of 
personal example. 
In an era in which students display aggravated violence even towards 
teachers, there is a real danger that the student will strike back at a teacher who 
attempts to spank him. Accordingly, it is preferable to apply the Jewish-law 
rationale that bans corporal punishment of a child who is older than twelve to 
thirteen to all students of any age, in view of the fear that students might hit 
back or curse. In other words, if that fear exists for children of lower ages 
nowadays—and I think it does—it is good reason for prohibiting corporal 
punishment in schools altogether.223 
IV 
CONCLUSION AND PROPOSALS 
 
Whether corporal punishment by parents and teachers should be permitted 
or prohibited is controversial. Differences between parents and teachers are 
distinguishing in this regard, some arising from the unique role of the parent, 
the special place of the family unit in our lives, and the delicate problem of the 
extent to which legal intervention should be carried out in its privacy, 
autonomy, and affairs. Other differences arise from analyzing the character of 
the teacher, his training, guidance, and role in society. 
Corporal punishment is a bad form of education, whether exercised by 
parents or by teachers. Good alternatives are less harmful to the child, both 
mentally and physically. Turning parents into offenders by criminalizing light 
corporal punishment is improper, both socially and legally. In view of the 
distinctions between parents and teachers as behavioral authorities, it is more 
logical to first impose a prohibition on corporal punishment within the 
educational system before doing so, if at all, in the family unit. 
 
 222. Rabbi Abraham, Yizhak HaCohen Kook, Hador (The Generation), in EDER HAYAKAR 
VEIKVEI HATZON 107–16 (1985) (Heb.) (linking corporal punishment with the dangers posed by the 
lack of personal examples for children to imitate) (unverified). 
 223. See, e.g., Kitzur Shulhan Arukh 143:18 (“It is prohibited to beat the grown son, and maturity 
does not depend on years but everything is according to the nature of the son. If there is a sense that he 
will defy [the educator] in speech or action, even if he is not yet bar-mitzva [at the age of 13], it is 
prohibited to beat him, but he must be rebuked verbally. And whoever beats his grown son will be 
banned because he transgresses against ‘You shall not put an obstacle before the blind.’” See Leviticus 
19:14). Of course, teachers must have the right to defend themselves or to defend students when they 
are subject to violence, but this is not educational punishment. This is self defense or necessity. These 
are defenses of excuse, whereas educational corporal punishment may be considered a defense of 
justification. 
SHMUELI 10/25/2010 12:56:04 PM 
Spring 2010]       EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM VS. PARENTS: A COMPARATIVE VIEW 319 
The Scandinavian–Austrian–German civil model regarding parental 
corporal punishment should be adopted in principle.224 This would grant the 
children a civil right to not be subjected to corporal or humiliating punishment 
yet would stop short of prohibiting corporal punishment as a criminal offense 
that would turn parents into offenders for breaking the law. Corporal 
punishment is not necessary; with appropriate guidance, everyone responsible 
for a child can avoid it. Integrating educational norms into the statutory model 
and launching a public-awareness campaign to assimilate the new, civil human-
rights norm and thereby alter public attitudes would provide a good and 
balanced solution, for public support is a prerequisite to a successful outcome. 
In countries in which a ban was created without such public-relations 
preparation, as in Israel (where it was banned in a court ruling), the ensuing 
controversies are proof that the process was not undertaken properly. In 
countries where parents can be criminally indicted for corporal punishment—
whether the ban is through statutes or court rulings—it is important for the 
prosecution to employ a policy of restraint. 
Here one must move delicately, especially in countries like the United 
States, in which corporal punishment is well-rooted in history, culture, and 
religion. A delicate approach does not mean relinquishing corporal punishment, 
nor does it necessarily entail criminalizing mild corporal punishment. Rather, it 
means education. One must understand that comparing corporal punishment 
with child abuse and suggesting that even mild corporal punishment may be a 
precursor to abuse, together with the analogy sometimes made between 
corporal punishment, spousal abuse, and child abuse225—even if true—may not 
be compelling to some segments of society. Corporal punishment is readily 
distinguishable from abuse by its underlying purpose: it is carried out, at least 
ostensibly, for the benefit of the child.226 In practice, it is hard to convince a 
society that draws a clear distinction between corporal punishment and 
domestic abuse.227 Many people also believe that corporal punishment is a 
religious tool.228 
Nonetheless, given a complete overview of the objectives and effects of 
corporal punishment, such punishment in the educational system must be 
totally and criminally banned, except for understandable cases of self-defense 
or necessity (as when a teacher must defend himself or others). Therefore, the 
third perception described above seems the most convincing—modified by 
 
 224. See Shmueli, supra note 5, at 135–37 (discussing the different spectrums of corporal punishment 
regulation). 
 225. See, e.g., Susan H. Bitensky, The Child’s Right to Humane Discipline Under the U.N. 
Convention on the Rights of the Child: The Mandate Against All Corporal Punishment for Children, 4 
LOY. POVERTY L.J. 47 (1998); Sarah Brady Brundage, Comment, Spare the Rod, Save the Child: 
Reviewing Corporal Punishment Through the Lens of Domestic Violence, 8 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. 
ADVOC. 83, 101–02 (2008). 
 226. Imbrogno, supra note 138, at 144. 
 227. See id. 
 228. Id. at 146. 
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adopting the civil–human-rights model respecting parents and not totally 
disallowing corporal punishment. Teachers and parents are not on equal 
footing. Both are responsible for the child’s education, but society must give the 
latter the appropriate means and the widest authority possible to raise and 
educate their own children. The law must direct parents to find alternative 
solutions to such humiliating and harmful measures as corporal punishment. At 
the same time, the law must be very careful not to tag corporal punishment as 
criminal. The civil-rights solution accompanied by a policy of restraint on the 
part of the prosecution seems to be the appropriate model for parents, in 
combination with the vital public-awareness campaign that will allow people to 
assimilate this norm. One cannot ignore public sentiment in countries like the 
United States, where there is greater approval for a penal prohibition on 
corporal punishment by teachers than on corporal punishment by parents. 
Granting civil rights to the child rather than criminalizing the parent seems 
more appropriate when considering corporal punishment by parents. But when 
it comes to teachers, the law must be unequivocal. Today’s teachers should not 
be permitted to spank students for many reasons, from teachers’ relative 
ignorance of their students’ characters to the preferences of involved, 
contemporary parents to not delegate all corrective authority to the teacher. 
Most important, teachers, more than others, should behave as exemplars of 
nonviolent authority, especially in an era in which students’ violence towards 
their classmates and teachers is on the rise. 
It is only logical and natural to ban corporal punishment first in the 
educational system, as this does not entail the difficulties encountered when 
intervening in families. Only after this step should consideration be given to 
some type of a ban in the family sphere, following the path of civil human 
rights. 
Some scholars have suggested looking at the situation from the perspective 
of adults and parental rights, while others have suggested looking at it from the 
perspective of children’s rights. Best is an integrated approach that focuses 
mainly on the rights of the child and on his human rights, but does not ignore 
parental rights, again supporting the civil–human-rights perspective regarding 
parental corporal punishment. This approach is in line with the UNCRC that 
sees the child as a human being with rights and not merely as a person who 
needs extensive protection by society and the law. But when it comes to 
teachers, state intervention should be unequivocal and decisive and should take 
effect within the criminal sphere. 
To return to the story of my late grandmother: My grandmother was 
disciplined. She had no devil in her. She was just a little girl who refused to be 
spanked with a cane for a “sin” she had not committed. I want to believe that in 
most western liberal countries this kind of case would end with a civil action 
and criminal charges being pressed against the teacher. To produce positive 
behavior in class, teachers must find alternatives to corporal punishment. 
 
